Moral Psychology, Volume 1

The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness

For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists in this emerging interdisciplinary field. The contributors to volume 1 discuss recent work on the evolution of moral beliefs, attitudes, and emotions. Each chapter includes an essay, comments on the essay by other scholars, and a reply by the author(s) of the original essay. Topics include a version of naturalism that avoids supposed fallacies, distinct neurocomputational systems for deontic reasoning, the evolutionary psychology of moral sentiments regarding incest, the sexual selection of moral virtues, the evolution of symbolic thought, and arguments both for and against innate morality. Taken together, the chapters demonstrate the value for both philosophy and psychology of collaborative efforts to understand the many complex aspects of morality.

Contributors to volume 1:
William Casebeer, Leda Cosmides, Oliver Curry, Michael Dietrich, Catherine Driscoll, Susan Dwyer, Owen Flanagan, Jerry Fodor, Gilbert Harman, Richard Joyce, Debra Lieberman, Ron Mallon, John Mikhail, Geoffrey Miller, Jesse Prinz, Peter Railton, Michael Ruse, Hagop Sarkissian, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Chandra Sekhar Sripada, Valerie Tiberius, John Tooby, Peter Tse, Kathleen Wallace, Arthur Wolf, David Wong

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Professor of Philosophy and Hardy Professor of Legal Studies at Dartmouth College.

Table of Contents

  1. Contents
  2. Acknowledgements
  3. Introduction
  4. 1. Naturalizing Ethics

    Owen Flanagan, Hagop Sarkissian, and David Wong

  5. 2. Can a General Deontic Logic Capture the Facts of Human Moral Reasoning? How the Mind Interprets Social Exchange Rules and Detects Cheaters

    Leda Cosmides and John Tooby

  6. 3. Moral Sentiments Relating to Incest: Discerning Adaptations from By-products

    Debra Lieberman

  7. 4. Kindness, Fidelity, and Other Sexually Selected Virtues

    Geoffrey Miller

  8. 5. Symbolic Thought and the Evolution of Human Morality

    Peter Ulric Tse

  9. 6. Nativism and Moral Psychology: Three Models of the Innate Structure That Shapes the Contents of Moral Norms

    Chandra Sekhar Sripada

  10. 7. Is Morality Innate?

    Jesse J. Prinz

  11. References
  12. Contributors
  13. Index to Volume 1
  14. Index to Volume 2
  15. Index to Volume 3