Representation and Reality


Hilary Putnam, who may have been the first philosopher to advance the notion that the computer is an apt model for the mind, takes a radically new view of his own theory of functionalism in this book. Putnam argues that in fact the computational analogy cannot answer the important questions about the nature of such mental states as belief, reasoning, rationality, and knowledge that lie at the heart of the philosophy of mind.

Table of Contents

  1. Preface
  2. Introduction
  3. 1. Meaning and Mentalism
  4. 2. Meaning, Other People, and the World
  5. 3. Fodor and Block on "Narrow Content"
  6. 4. Are There Such Things as Reference and Truth?
  7. 5. Why Functionalism Didn't Work
  8. 6. Other Forms of Functionalism
  9. 7. A Sketch of an Alternative Picture
  10. Appendix
  11. Notes
  12. Author Index