Varieties of Meaning

The 2002 Jean Nicod Lectures
Overview

Many different things are said to have meaning: people mean to do various things; tools and other artifacts are meant for various things; people mean various things by using words and sentences; natural signs mean things; representations in people's minds also presumably mean things. In Varieties of Meaning, Ruth Garrett Millikan argues that these different kinds of meaning can be understood only in relation to each other.

What does meaning in the sense of purpose (when something is said to be meant for something) have to do with meaning in the sense of representing or signifying? Millikan argues that the explicit human purposes, explicit human intentions, are represented purposes. They do not merely represent purposes; they possess the purposes that they represent. She argues further that things that signify, intentional signs such as sentences, are distinguished from natural signs by having purpose essentially; therefore, unlike natural signs, intentional signs can misrepresent or be false.

Part I discusses "Purposes and Cross-Purposes"—what purposes are, the purposes of people, of their behaviors, of their body parts, of their artifacts, and of the signs they use. Part II then describes a previously unrecognized kind of natural sign, "locally recurrent" natural signs, and several varieties of intentional signs, and discusses the ways in which representations themselves are represented. Part III offers a novel interpretation of the way language is understood and of the relation between semantics and pragmatics. Part IV discusses perception and thought, exploring stages in the development of inner representations, from the simplest organisms whose behavior is governed by perception-action cycles to the perceptions and intentional attitudes of humans.

Table of Contents

  1. Series Foreword
  2. Preface
  3. Purposes and Cross-purposes
  4. 1. Purposes and Cross-purposes of Humans
  5. 2. Purposes and Cross-purposes of Memes
  6. Natural Signs and Intentional Signs
  7. 3. Local Natural Signs and Information
  8. 4. Productivity and Embedding in Natural Signs
  9. 5. Teleosemantic Theories
  10. 6. Intentionality
  11. 7. Intensionality
  12. Outer Intentional Signs
  13. 8. Linguistic Signs Emerge from Natural Signs
  14. 9. Direct Perception through Language
  15. 10. Tracking the Domains of Conventional Signs
  16. 11. Varieties of the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction
  17. 12. Demonstratives, Indexicals, and a Bit More about Descriptions
  18. Inner Intentional Signs
  19. 13. Inner Pushmi-pullyus
  20. 14. Detaching Representations of Objects
  21. 15. Space and Time
  22. 16. Detaching Goal State Representations
  23. 17. Generating Goal State Representations
  24. 18. Limitations on Nonhuman Thought
  25. 19. Conjectures on Human Thought
  26. References
  27. Index