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Cartesian Common Sense An appeal to rationality and common sense ­which he defined in his 1992 Barcelona talk as "things that are obvious to us if we pay a little attention to what we experience and what we do" ("Creation") ­ recurs regularly in Chomsky's work. Its source is in Cartesian thought. In explaining what he means by Cartesian common sense, Chomsky expands on the notion in a modern-day context: [I]t does not require very far-reaching, specialized knowledge to perceive that the United States was invading South Vietnam. And, in fact, to take apart the system of illusions and deception which functions to prevent understanding of contemporary reality [is] not a task that requires extraordinary skill or understanding. It requires the kind of normal skepticism and willingness to apply one's analytical skills that almost all people have and that they can exercise. It just happens that they exercise them in analyzing what the New England Patriots ought to do next Sunday instead of questions that really matter for human life, their own included. (Chomsky Reader 35) Chomsky employs this appeal to reason in probing two important issues: the relevance of the irrational and the role of the intellectual in society. To the irrational he consigns "fundamentalist religion; JFK conspiracy cults; realist theory in International Relations ­ Morgenthau, etc.; loony invocation of Stalin's genius or the `free market' or `Wilsonian idealism' and other forms of secular fanaticism, such as most of Marxology" (31 Mar. 1995). These "forms" are not only ignored by Chomsky (and those who comprise his milieu), but are also, on occasion, linked to reactionary movements, primarily because they promulgate a belief that understanding is for the initiated. Rational thinking, of course, does not necessarily protect us against authoritarian politics, but, as Chomsky notes, "irrationality leaves open the door to anything, hence in particular to the worst forms of authoritarianism" (13 Dec. 1994). And viewpoints that deviate from one's own ­ whether they be judged irrational, reactionary, or even morally unacceptable ­ should clearly not, for that reason, be subject to controls. Chomsky suggests, instead, that we pay attention to right-wing ideologues: "if their arguments hold up to scrutiny [they] should be respected; I don't regard this as even a matter of dispute. I do that all the time, and often find arguments of `the right' much more impressive than those of `the left.' Why should this be surprising?" (15 Dec. 1992). Should we, nevertheless, play down certain kinds of knowledge or limit research in some areas? Chomsky is skeptical: The idea that some kinds of knowledge should be "played down because of negative implications" is one that I find a bit frightening. Who makes the decision to "play down the truth?" Who determines the "implications"? Where does that power lie, and what are its sources or its justification? I see here the road to fascism and Stalinism, ideas that have great appeal to the intellectual class ­ including those who call themselves anti-Stalinist, anti-fascist, liberal, etc. [ ­ and this is] something I've attempted to document. (15 Dec. 1992) The second issue that prompts the appeal to reason ­ the role of the intellectual in society ­ is reflected in Chomsky's teaching, lecturing, and research habits. His approach to work, and indeed his very manner of living, derives from a rationalist perspective that emphasizes ideas and their advancement rather than honors and their procurement, or power and its accumulation. In 1971, one of his former classmates, Israel Shenker, wrote: At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he is the Ferrari P. Ward Professor of Modern Languages and Linguistics, Noam Chomsky could pass as an aging student. His office is unkempt and weary ­ torn green shades, dusty volumes, a chair in the final stages of disintegration ­ but he presides with blithe unconcern over such externals, and with intense devotion to what he considers essentials. ("Noam Chomsky" 105) This, of course, is typical of the many testimonials to Chomsky's unconcern with appearances, his lack of interest in the star status that has been accorded to him, and his fierce determination to identify and concentrate upon what is most important on numerous fronts.