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The Function of the Academic Chomsky has, over the years, pursued his early interest in the academic's role and the university's function in contemporary society. He is quick to note the degree of collusion between intellectuals and state policies, even when these policies are clearly oppressive, violent, or illegal. The reasons academics often assume this managerial role in relation to society, Chomsky feels, are related to their quest for power, their belief (carefully cultivated by those institutions closest to the centers of power) in the fundamentally benign nature of Western institutions, and the high level of indoctrination to which they have been submitted as members of the ruling elite. Chomsky's views on these matters are often similar to those of the thinkers who had a formative influence on his outlook, notably Bakunin and Pannekoek. Typically, these views are based on values such as social responsibility, academic integrity, and commitment to a truthful and undistorted representation of facts. They lead Chomsky to confrontations with groups and individuals who are concerned only with serving the interests of power, who promote the cause of one group while turning a blind eye to the larger principles at stake.

Dwight Macdonald (biographical sketch)

By the mid- to late 1970s, Chomsky had already experienced such clashes on numerous fronts. He had faced pro-Israeli groups, anti-Communist groups, pro­Cold War groups, just as, during the Second World War, people such as Dwight Macdonald had faced anti-Nazi groups who denounced the refusal of Macdonald and the others to support the Allied side. Chomsky adamantly rejected the assumption that a given group might have an intrinsic right to act aggressively simply because of its history: Israelis do not have the right to employ brutal tactics against the Palestinians because they themselves have been persecuted, the American government should not get away with terrorist activities because it allows for more debate than the Bolsheviks did, and the fundamental rights of individuals should not be expunged because their views don't correspond with those of the ruling elites. Though they may seem to be truisms, these basic tenets led Chomsky to engage in a number of high-pitched debates that began in the early 1960s and still continue. In the case of Israel, the earliest public confrontation occurred in 1969, during a public talk at MIT. Chomsky recalls: "I was embarrassingly mild, and elicited a huge furor, including very sharp criticism from what was considered the dovish left, even delegations coming to my house to talk me out of my evil ways (namely, suggesting that maybe Palestinians were human, and recalling the actual history of Zionism)" (13 Feb. 1996). Beginning in the early 1970s, Chomsky's university talks on this subject began to elicit violent reactions. As a consequence, he has had to take precautions, "including undercover police protection (when I refuse uniformed police protection) at universities, if I am giving a talk on the Middle East" (13 Feb. 1996). There is a rhetorical side to these issues. Much of the debate they spark exploits a similar kind of language: words such as "subtleties," "complexities," and "niceties" keep the uninitiated at arm's length from the decision-making process. The American people, the line goes, cannot be directly involved in foreign affairs because they don't understand the "subtleties" of the international situation. Individuals should not have a voice in government finance because they don't comprehend the stakes ­ the "complexities" are beyond their grasp. Citizens should not have direct access to the institutions that control their lives, notably corporations and governments, because they don't have the highly technical knowledge required to appreciate the "niceties" of domestic and foreign trade. Chomsky naturally abhors these views; there is, he assures us, a deliberate attempt on the part of intellectuals and government representatives (and journalists, but in different ways) to shroud simple facts in obtuse language in order to keep the "rabble" out. This deliberate obscuring of facts is, in his view, typical of the so-called postmodern period, and symptomatic of a much larger problem concerning social control. Another striking feature of postmodernism is, he writes, its "extreme character and the fact that it absorbs elements that consider themselves `on the left' ­ the kind of people who years earlier would have been organizing and teaching in worker schools" (31 Mar. 1995). Chomsky's disparaging descriptions of the ivory-tower mentality­ which dictates not only that academics will be allowed intellectual freedom, but that they will also be worshiped, given special privileges, and encouraged to speak only to other full-fledged members of the elite ­ are probably best understood within the kind of framework envisioned by Bakunin. He maintained that intellectuals in a good society should be workers whose primary tools happen to be their intellects. By extension, laborers in the same society would also employ the necessary tools, but, like the intellectuals, would be called upon to do tasks traditionally executed by managers; they would organize, plan, and control the products of their own work. The prestige normally associated with select kinds of work would evaporate in the same way as it had in the Deweyite school that Chomsky had attended until the age of twelve. This is not to say that the advantages of one kind of work as opposed to another would disappear. Intellectuals, by the very nature of their job, would continue to have access to certain kinds of information. But, just as the product of the miners' work is shared for the collective (and individual) good, so, too, would the product of the intellectuals' work. And the miners, now more accustomed to perceiving themselves as people capable of analyzing and planning, would be in a better position to make use of the knowledge that would help to improve their own lives (this is the kind of argument proposed by, for example, Ken Coates). Consistent with Chomsky's overriding approach is a rejection, as well (for virtually the same reasons), of authoritarian socialism, of enlightened rulers, and of other organs, benign or not, that attempt to dictate to people what they should consider to be in their own best interests. Chomsky utilizes this approach on several occasions during this period ­ such as in the paper "Equality: Language Development, Human Intelligence, and Social Organization," delivered at the Conference on the Promise and Problems of Human Equality held at the University of Illinois in 1976; and an interview with Chomsky that was published in a 1978 edition of Working Papers in Linguistics. It can also be found, however, in many of his linguistic texts. In fact, because of the interest manifested by a growing segment of academia in Chomsky's linguistic work, and due to the increasing recognition among activists of his political work, many of the talks that he gave from this point onward included discussions of both linguistic and political issues. Sometimes both would be included in the same talk, and sometimes they would be covered in back-to-back talks: Chomsky often speaks to both linguistic and political issues wherever he goes. But he is careful never to set up these talks like academic conferences: What are called "conferences" ­ gatherings of intellectuals ­ I almost never attend. I do give endless talks and take part in many forums, but not the kind that would be called conferences. I almost always turn down invitations to these. Thus I almost never go to the Socialist Scholars Conference (though I have a lot of personal friends there), or to academic and professional conferences, etc. Virtually all of my talks are for popular and activist groups, though typically, they are combined with talks at universities, sometimes seminars, but more often for mass audiences interested in the general area. (31 Mar. 1995) In the kind of talks that he is referring to here are represented an astonishing diversity of concerns: "To mention some current and typical examples, I've been on several forums with local organizers trying to react to the Gingrich assault (welfare mothers, etc.), a panel organized by the Decatur Illinois strikers seeking broader understanding of the very fundamental issues involved in that attempt to destroy the last functioning industrial union, local community groups, etc" (31 Mar. 1995). The texts Chomsky published during this period, particularly Language and Responsibility (1979) and Radical Priorities (1981), contain wide-ranging discussions of the many disciplines that have interested him since his youth; they also, quite separately, demonstrate the development of his ideas on politics and linguistics. He continued to discourage his audience's tendency to identify overlaps between the two realms. But he did employ his own method of prioritizing the two subject areas: "I have a rule of thumb to determine how serious a place it is: relative audience size. In a sane community, most would come to the political talks. Often it's the other way around" (18 Feb. 1993).