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May 2007
ISBN 0262026031
786 pp.
16 illus.
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Consciousness, Function, and Representation
Ned Block

This volume of Ned Block's writings collects his papers on consciousness, functionalism, and representationism. A number of these papers treat the significance of the multiple realizability of mental states for the mind-body problem¿a theme that has concerned Block since the 1960s. The papers on consciousness treat such conceptual issues as phenomenal versus access consciousness, Dennett's theory of consciousness, and the function of consciousness. Turning to the mind-body problem, Block defends physicalism against Max Black's argument concerning phenomenal modes of presentation. The papers on representationism consider "mental paint" as well as the "Inverted Earth" thought experiment¿a world in which colors are reversed but there is a compensating reversal in the words that are used to describe them.

Table of Contents
 Contents
 Introduction: Remarks on Chauvinism and the Mind-Body Problem
I Functionalism
1 Functionalism
2 What Is Functionalism?
3 What Psychological States Are Not, with J. Fodor
4 Troubles with Functionalism
5 What Intuitions about Homunculi Do Not Show
II Concepts of Consciousness
6 Consciousness
7 Review of Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained
8 What Is Dennett's Theory a Theory Of?
9 On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness
10 How Many Concepts of Consciousness?
11 Biology versus Computation in the Study of Consciousness
12 Ridiculing Social Constructivism about Phenomenal Consciousness
13 Concepts of Consciousness
III Empirical Approaches to Consciousness
14 How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness
15 Paradox and Cross-Purposes in Recent Work on Consciousness
16 Spatial Perception via Tactile Sensation
17 Two Neural Correlates of Consciousness
18 Review of Alva Noe¿, Action in Perception
IV Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem
19 Are Absent Qualia Impossible?
20 The Harder Problem of Consciousness
21 Max Black's Objection to Mind-Body Identity
V Consciousness and Representation
22 Qualia
23 Inverted Earth
24 Mental Paint
25 Sexism, Racism, Ageism, and the Nature of Consciousness
26 Is Experiencing Just Representing?
27 Bodily Sensations as an Obstacle for Representationism
 Name Index
 Subject Index
 
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