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Jun 2008
ISBN 0262232669
384 pp.
2 illus.
The Case for Qualia
Edmond Wright

Many philosophers and cognitive scientists dismiss the notion of qualia, sensory experiences that are internal to the brain. Leading opponents of qualia (and of Indirect Realism, the philosophical position that has qualia as a central tenet) include Michael Tye, Daniel Dennett, Paul and Patricia Churchland, and even Frank Jackson, a former supporter. Qualiaphiles apparently face the difficulty of establishing philosophical contact with the real when their access to it is seen by qualiaphobes to be second-hand and, worse, hidden behind a "veil of sensation"-a position that would slide easily into relativism and solipsism, presenting an ethical dilemma. In The Case for Qualia, proponents of qualia defend the indirect realist position and mount detailed counterarguments against opposing views.

Table of Contents
 Introduction by Edmond Wright
I Philosophical Defenses
1 The Case for Indirect Realism
by Harold I. Brown
2 Illusions and Hallucinations as Evidence for Sense Data
by E. J. Lowe
3 Experience and Representation
by William S. Robinson
4 Qualia Realism: Its Phenomenal Contents and Discontents
by George Graham and Terence Horgan
5 The World of Qualia
by Matjaz Potrc
6 Subjective Physicalism
by Robert J. Howell
II Scientific Defenses
7 Color Qualities and the Physical World
by C. L. Hardin
8 Heat, Temperature, and Phenomenal Concepts
by Isabelle Peschard and Michel Bitbol
9 A Process-oriented View of Qualia
by Riccardo Manzotti
10 The Ontological Status of Qualia and Sensations: How They Fit into the Brain
by John Smythies
III Attacks
11 The Churchlands' War on Qualia
by Mark Crooks
12 Why Frank Should Not Have Jilted Mary
by Howard Robinson
13 Phenomenal Knowledge without Experience
by Torin Alter
14 A Defense of Qualia in the Strong Sense
by Barry Maund
15 How to Believe in Qualia
by Amy Kind
16 Transparency and the Unity of Experience
by John O'Dea
17 Phenomenal Character and the Transparency of Experience
by Martine Nida-R¿melin
18 From the Looks of Things: The Explanatory Failure of Representationalism
by Diana Raffman
19 Why Transparency Is Unethical
by Edmond Wright

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