MIT CogNet, The Brain Sciences ConnectionFrom the MIT Press, Link to Online Catalog
SPARC Communities
Subscriber : Stanford University Libraries » LOG IN

space

Powered By Google 
Advanced Search

Selected Title Details  
Aug 1995
ISBN 0262531313
288 pp.
BUY THE BOOK
Past, Space, and Self
John Campbell

"Campbell is interested in mapping some of the very general structural features of human thought. In particular, he is interested in discovering what is distinctive about the kind of self-consciousness that we humans have.... His main instrument is an exceptional talent for the kind of subtle self-examination the project demands. The book is an acutely observed study of a territory too close at hand for most of us to see, and deserves to be read by psychologists as well as philosophers."
-- Huw Price, Times Literary Supplement

Humans were thought to be unique among the species in having minds, but recent results showing the richness and diversity in animal psychology makes this view untenable. Yet there remains the question of whether we can map the features of a particularly human psychology that are responsible for its overall structure. In this book John Campbell shows that the general structural features of human thought can be seen as having their source in the distinctive ways in which we think about space and time. He describes the contrasts between animal representations of space and time and distinctively human ways of thinking about them. In particular, he shows what is special about the human ability of to think about the past.

Campbell looks at how self-consciousness exploits these particular abilities in thinking about space and the past. He discusses at length the relation between self-consciousness and the first person and how fundamental the first person is in ordinary thought. Campbell shows that the structured character of ordinary thinking can be explained by reference to the demands of first-person thinking and the way in which first-person thiinking exploits distinctively human respresentations of space and time. Finally, he considers the metaphysical implications of this approach, in particular, how ordinary self-consciousness relies on a realist view of the past.

Table of Contents
 Preface
 Introduction
1 Frames of Reference
2 The Past
3 The First Person
4 Self-Reference and Self-Knowledge
5 The Reductionist View of the Self
6 Conceptual Structure and
7 The Realism of Memory
 Notes
 References
 Index
 
Options
Related Topics
Psychology


© 2010 The MIT Press
MIT Logo