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Abstract:
Recent clinical and neuroimaging data have suggested that the
ability to think about mental states, or employ a "theory of mind,"
may be associated with highly specific neural mechanisms. To
investigate this possibility, high-density ERPs were used to
characterize the neural circuitry of thinking about mental versus
non-mental representations (e.g. beliefs vs. photographs).
Participants were presented with short narratives in which an
observer either commented on or took a photo of two objects.
Subsequently, one object was moved to a new location in the absence
of the observer. Participants were asked about either the
observer's belief about the location of the objects (mental
representation), or the location of the objects in the photograph.
Results showed a left-lateralized enhancement of an early frontal
positivity peaking at 250 ms for the mental representations
relative to the photographs. In addition, a positive deflection was
noted at 825 ms under these same left-frontal sites for mental
representations. This late positivity was either absent or greatly
attenuated in the photograph condition. These findings help clarify
the neural mechanisms underlying with theory of mind
reasoning.
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