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The Influence of Implicit Consequentiality On Interpreting Anaphors

 Andrew J. Stewart, Martin J. Pickering and Anthony J. Sanford
  
 

Abstract:

A considerable amount of work suggests that the comprehension of anaphora is affected by the implicit causality information associated with verbs (e.g. Caramazza, Grober, Garvey and Yates, 1977). However, there has been little consideration of how other aspects of verb semantics can affect anaphoric processing. In this talk, we define another type of verb semantic information which we call implicit consequentiality, and investigate its effects on anaphoric resolution.

In sentence-completion tasks, we found that for fragments such as 'Because Harold dreaded Justin...', there was a strong preference to write a continuation that provided information about the consequences associated with the first mentioned character, Harold, rather than with the second mentioned character, Justin. Hence, the verb 'dread' is an NP1 biasing verb for consequentiality. We also found a set of NP2 biasing verbs, in which there was a strong preference to write a continuation about the second mentioned character. In general, implicit consequentiality biases were distinct from implicit causality biases.

We report two reading experiments that demonstrate effects of implicit consequentiality on comprehension. Subjects read sentences like:

1. Because Harold dreaded Justin, he steadfastly refused to go back to school.

2. Because Harold dreaded Justin, he was told to try acting less aggressively.

The verb 'dreaded' is NP1 biasing. In (1), the continuation is compatible with this bias, but in (2) the continuation is incompatible with this bias. We found an implicit consequentiality congruency effect, with the continuation in (1) being read faster than the continuation in (2). This is similar to the implicit causality congruency effect (e.g. Stewart et al., 1996).

In conditions in which the pronominal anaphor was replaced with a repeat name, we found a repeat name penalty (e.g. Gordon, Grosz and Gillion, 1993) that was independent of verb bias. This penalty simply corresponds to a reading difficulty associated with repetition of the first mentioned character's name. We suggest that implicit consequentiality does not affect the initial interpretation of sentences containing repeat name anaphors.

A second experiment found that the congruency effect was larger if the pronouns were locally ambiguous (as in (1) and (2)) than if they were disambiguated by gender. This suggests that readers can use implicit consequentiality information in the initial processing of pronouns. This provides a clear contrast with our findings on the processing of implicit causality information.

It is possible that the processor can access implicit consequentiality more rapidly than implicit causality. We argue against this interpretation, and instead suggest that the processor pays immediate attention to resolving pronouns in the subject position of main clauses, as in (1) and (2).

 
 


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