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Ideas Concerning a "New Computationalism": Its Limits and its relation to VR

 Rainer Born
  
 

Abstract:

(Invited Talk)

Jerome Bruner (Acts of Meaning/1990 p 2) emphasizes that we should try to "recapture the original momentum of [what he called] the first cognitive revolution". It's aim according to Bruner was to bring back "mind" into the human sciences after a long cold winter of objectivism. A renewed cognitive revolution should be a more interpretive approach to cognition concerned with "meaning-making". The aim of the original revolution (Bruner p 2) was "to discover and to describe formally the meanings that huan being created out of their accounters with the world, and then to propose hypotheses about what meaning-making processes were implicated".

But from very early on "emphasis began shifting from »meaning« to »Information«, from construction of meaning to the processing of meaning" (Bruner p 4). Thus very soon "computing became the model of the mind, and in place of the concept of meaning there emerged the concept of computability" (Bruner p 6). Bruners proposal for a reassesing of the cognitive revolution is (Bruner p 11): to "return to the question of how to construct a mental science around the concept of meaning and the processes by which meanings are created and negotiated within the community".

The aim of my own considerations is accordingly to come to terms with Bruners suggestion and find a new understanding of "computation/computationalism" that can to justice to both Bruners qualms and produce a better handling of the problems we are up to in the Cognitive Sciences and in some recent publication on the topic, e. g. Lakoff/Johnson: Philosophy in the Flesh and Philosophical Computer. Meaning, to put this concept into the center of our attention, way back in Frege's concern as "Sinn", can be studied as "means to come to terms with reality". The problem is, how do they work/function? What is it that we really can explain in invokig their existence (or assumed "intentional stance"/Dennetts' "as if") and essentially which processes (in their relation to an embodied computational approach) can generate meanings (evoke mental states) in such a way that they we can adjust ourselves properly [whatever that may be] to (problematic) situations in the world, using attitudes to explain and predict the behaviour of others ( according to the assumtion of other's minds).

So I shall investigte with the help of some easy formal means and graphics the very idea of computation and how it got transformed and perhaps misapplied (according to some misunderstanding of Turing) in a literal way to "understanding the mind".

Some preconceptions (of this analysis) can be found in my article on Turing and in some short piece on communication in the internet [ http://www.iwp.uni-linz.ac.at/ ... ].

What is essential for my analysis is the relalion between model and reality and what some simulation [e g. in the context of virtual reality programs] can tell us about a realm under inverstigation, furthermore how the algorithms, that is envoked by the model can be projected "onto" reality and which "action guiding" operationalisations it does produce in our daily practice, i. e. how do we study or eventually grasp those processes which generate meaning and how can we then use this to build up meaning (e. g. in education), i. e. convey of offer meaning, such that the behaviour of "other minds" [of course persons etc. -- I hope that joke is allowed for in the symposium] becomes understandable and we can adjust ourselves to them or their needs.

 
 


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