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Abstract:
(Invited Talk)
A narrow mechanist holds that the mind is a machine equivalent
to a Turing machine. A wide mechanist holds that the mind is a
machine but countenances the possibility of
information-processing machines that cannot be mimicked by a
universal Turing machine, allowing in particular that the mind
may be such a machine. Relying on neglected work by Turing, I
argue that it is wide mechanism, not narrow, that is the
legitimate descendant of the historical mechanism of Descartes,
Hobbes, La Mettrie, et al. It is often said that logical work by
Turing and Church has shown that mechanism is exhausted by narrow
mechanism, but this view is a muddle. Turing himself, a mechanist
par excellence, was not a narrow mechanist. Standard arguments
for narrow mechanism are vitiated by various closely related
fallacies, including the equivalence fallacy and the simulation
fallacy
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