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Abstract:
(Contributed Talk)
Computationalism is the view that computation, an abstract
notion lacking semantics and real-world interaction, can offer an
explanatory basis for cognition. This paper argues that not only
is this view correct, but that computation, properly understood,
would seem to be the only possible form of explanation! The
argument is straightforward: To maximise their chances of
success, cognitive agents need to make predictions about their
environment. Models enable us to make predictions, so agents
presumably incorporate a model of their environment as part of
their architecture. Constructing a model requires instantiating a
physical "device" having the necessary dynamics. A program and
the computation it defines comprise an abstract specification for
a causal system. An agent's model of its world (and presumably
its entire mechanism) can thus be described in computational
terms too, so computationalism must be correct. Given these
interpretations, the paper refutes arguments that purport to show
that everything implements every computation (arguments which, if
correct, would render the notion of computation vacuous.) It then
goes on to consider how physical systems can "understand" and
interact intelligently with their environment, and also looks at
dynamical systems and the symbolic vs. connectionist issue.
Full text of contribution
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