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Neural Representation of Natural Kinds and Artifacts.
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| | Phyllis Koenig, Christian DeVita, Guila Glosser, David Alsop, Gee James, John Detre, Carol McSorley, Jennifer Morris, Ayanna Cooke and Murray Grossman |
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Abstract:
Selective impairment in naming natural kinds or man-made
artifacts suggests separate neurological representation of these
semantic categories. It has been hypothesized that distinguishing
among natural kinds involves fine-grained visual-perceptual
processing, with lexical access requiring recruitment of
visual-perceptual brain areas, while distinguishing among artifacts
entails knowledge about function as well, with lexical access also
recruiting motor-kinesthetic brain areas. Previous studies were
confounded by the use of tasks involving different decision-making
processes for each category. This study used fMRI to compare
cerebral activity during semantic processing of words for animals
and household implements, with pseudowords as baseline stimuli. Ten
subjects judged visually presented animal and implement terms for
pleasantness, a task that ensured a common cognitive process for
all semantic and baseline stimuli. Words were presented every four
seconds, in 40 second word-category blocks, for a total of six
blocks per category and twelve blocks of pseudowords. We observed
activation in the left posterior temporal lobe (BA 22) during the
animals condition. In contrast, the implements condition produced
left occipital activation (BA 18), along with bilateral striatal
activity. These results confirm the distinction in neural
representation of the two semantic categories. The involvement of
the striatum in judging implements suggests additional recruitment
of motor-related areas in the semantic processing of terms for
manipulable objects.
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