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Abstract:
In any attempt to develop a science of consciousness,
first-person experience must play a necessary role. Unless
introspective data is taken seriously, it is unclear what theories
of consciousness or empirical investigations would be seeking to
explain. However, there has been much disagreement over the
question of how best to obtain first-person data. The formal
introspection methods of the early structuralist psychologists
(e.g., Tichner) failed, in part because of mistaken assumptions
about how perceptual experience is built, and in part because of an
inability to replicate across the introspective reports of
similarly trained observers. The approaches of European
phenomenologists (e.g., Husserl) have not enjoyed wide-spread
acceptance within North American philosophy. Meditative and
contemplative disciplines employ rigorous training and prolonged
practice in introspective methodologies, but are often embedded in
religious contexts that do not transport easily across cultures.
Within consciousness studies currently, there is an active
reexamination of various traditions and systems that have sought to
develop reliable methods for obtaining knowledge about first-person
experience and its communication across individuals. There is also
a growing interest in how these apparently different approaches may
overlap or complement each other. The eight chapters within this
section examine the variety of methods and assumptions
characterizing contemporary approaches to first-person experience
and intersubjectivity.
Full text of Introduction
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