Introduction

From the viewpoint of developmental psychology, human cognitive growth proceeds in a hierarchically organized manner during sensorimotor maturation. According to Piaget, an infant is initially able to conceive of himself and others only in terms of the direct effects of and on his body; for example, the infant is only able to conceive of graspable objects that are within reach (Piaget, 1953). The initially random and spontaneous actions, or motor bubblings, of the infant come to be internally associated with the visual, kinesthetic, and somatosensory information that is contingent upon and highly correlated with them, leading to the emergence of an unconscious “enactive” body schema that is action dependent. As they become familiar with the surrounding space, thus resulting in overlearning with regard to object manipulation, by the age of 9 to 10 months children gain the abilities needed to handle action-free visual images, or “ikonic” representations of their own body; these abilities enable a child to dissociate a spatially organized internal schema from supporting actions, thus becoming free from the actions (Bruner, Oliver, & Greenfield, 1966). The ikonic representation would admit the dissociation of self from others, thus permitting self-awareness.

What are the neural bases for a body schema or body image? The idea that the construction of an internal representation of the body is based on the synthesis of visual and somatosensory sensations is almost a century old (Head & Holmes, 1911). This chapter considers how the body schema, a representation of the spatial relations among the parts of the body, is represented in the monkey and human brain, and how it is modified by experience. We also discuss how research on the body schema can be used to understand the neural mechanisms related to body image (i.e., the conscious and manipulable body schema) and self-awareness.