Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Volume 21 : Issue 1

Table of Contents

• The development of features in object concepts  
  Philippe G. Schyns, Robert L. Goldstone and Jean-Pierre Thibaut
  Page 1-17
• Eigenfeatures as intermediate-level representations: The case for PCA models 
  Herv;eacute; Abdi, Dominique Valentin and Betty G. Edelman
  Page 17-18
• Feature see, feature do 
  Philip J. Benson
  Page 18-19
• A creationist myth: Pragmatic combination not feature creation 
  Nick Braisby and Bradley Franks
  Page 19-20
• The development of new functional features by instruction: The case of medical education 
  Lee R. Brooks
  Page 20-21
• Fixed versus flexible features in dissociable neural processing subsystems 
  E. Darcy Burgund and Chad J. Marsolek
  Page 21-22
• The other hard problem: How to bridge the gap between symbolic and subsymbolic cognition 
  Axel Cleeremans
  Page 22-23
• Flexible categorization requires the creation of relational features 
  Peter F. Dominey
  Page 23-24
• Flexible features, connectionism, and computational learning theory 
  Georg Dorffner
  Page 24-25
• Things are what they seem 
  Shimon Edelman
  Page 25-25
• Building block dilemmas 
  Christopher Gauker
  Page 26-27
• Self-organizing features and categories through attentive resonance 
  Stephen Grossberg
  Page 27-28
• A framework for structural constraints on feature creation 
  Scott A. Huettel and Gregory R. Lockhead
  Page 29-29
• Can features be created on the fly? 
  Koen Lamberts
  Page 30-31
• Finding the Pope in the pizza: Abstract invariants and cognitive constraints on perceptual learning 
  John E. Hummel and Philip J. Kellman
  Page 30-30
• New features for old: Creation or derivation? 
  Cyril R. Latimer
  Page 31-32
• Feature learning, multiresolution analysis, and symbol grounding 
  Karl F. MacDorman
  Page 32-32
• Formal models and feature creation 
  Thomas J. Palmeri
  Page 32-33
• Feature creation as a byproduct of attentional processing 
  Pierre Perruchet and Annie Vinter
  Page 33-34
• Context-dependent feature discovery is evidence that the coordination of function is a basic cognitive capacity 
  W. A. Phillips
  Page 34-35
• Emergence of object representations in young infants: Corroborating findings and a challenge for the feature creation approach 
  Paul C. Quinn
  Page 35-36
• Parts of visual shape as primitives for categorization 
  Manish Singh and Barbara Landau
  Page 36-37
• Parts, features, and expertise 
  James Tanaka
  Page 37-38
• Do features arise out of nothing? 
  Adriaan Tijsseling
  Page 38-39
• Who needs created features? 
  Katja Wiemer-Hastings and Arthur C. Graesser
  Page 39-39
• Feature learning during the acquisition of perceptual expertise 
  Pepper Williams, Isabel Gauthier and Michael J. Tarr
  Page 40-41
• Ways of featuring in object categorization 
  Philippe G. Schyns, Robert L. Goldstone and Jean-Pierre Thibaut
  Page 41-54
• A common structure for concepts of individuals, stuffs, and real kinds: More Mama, more milk, and more mouse 
  Ruth Garrett Millikan
  Page 55-65
• Different structures for concepts of individuals, stuffs, and real kinds: One Mama, more milk, and many mice 
  Paul Bloom
  Page 66-67
• Animal concepts 
  Colin Allen
  Page 66-66
• Concepts in artificial organisms 
  Angelo Cangelosi and Domenico Parisi
  Page 68-69
• Names, and what they are names of 
  Greg Carlson
  Page 69-70
• Are there wordlike concepts too? 
  Christopher Gauker
  Page 70-71
• What is the point? Concepts, description, and rigid designation 
  Bradley Franks and Nick Braisby
  Page 70-70
• Etiological classification and the acquisition and structure of knowledge 
  Michael T. Ghiselin
  Page 72-73
• What can externalism do for psychologists? 
  Alison Gopnik
  Page 73-74
• Staying in touch: Externalism needs descriptions 
  James A. Hampton
  Page 74-74
• Reidentification and redescription 
  Marc D. Hauser and W. Tecumseh Fitch
  Page 74-74
• The most basic units of thought do more, and less, than point 
  Frank Keil
  Page 75-76
• Concept acquisition and use occurs in (real) context 
  Kenneth R. Livingston
  Page 77-78
• Finding order in our world: The primacy of the concrete in neural representations and the role of invariance in substance reidentification 
  Bruce J. MacLennan
  Page 78-79
• Whatever happened to meaning? 
  Jean M. Mandler
  Page 79-80
• Too much substance, not enough cognition 
  Vincent C. M;uuml;ller and Stephanie Kelter
  Page 80-80
• Extensional assumptions in theories of meaning and concepts 
  Gregory L. Murphy
  Page 80-81
• Beyond substance concepts in cognitive development 
  Katherine Nelson
  Page 81-82
• Room for concept development? 
  Josef Perner
  Page 82-83
• Explanatory force, antidescriptionism, and the common structure of substance concepts 
  
  Page 84-85
• More me? Substance concepts and self concepts 
  Carol Slater
  Page 85-85
• Semantic realism, rigid designation, and dynamic semantics 
  Alice G. B. ter Meulen
  Page 85-86
• A white thing 
  J. van Brakel
  Page 86-88
• Words are invitations to learn about categories 
  Sandra Waxman and William Thompson
  Page 88-88
• Concepts are not beliefs, but having concepts is having beliefs 
  Fei Xu, Joshua B. Tenenbaum and Cristina M. Sorrentino
  Page 89-89
• Theory of mind in nonhuman primates 
  C. M. Heyes
  Page 101-114
• Imitation and mirror self-recognition may be developmental precursors to theory of mind in human and nonhuman primates 
  Kim A. Bard
  Page 115-115
• Seeing is not believing 
  Gergely Csibra
  Page 117-118
• Apes ape! 
  Deborah Custance
  Page 118-119
• The prior question: Do human primates have a theory of mind? 
  Robert M. Gordon
  Page 120-121
• Theory of mind in nonhuman primates: A question of language? 
  Colin Gray and Phil Russell
  Page 121-121
• Anecdotes, omniscience, and associative learning in examining the theory of mind 
  Steven M. Green, David L. Wilson and Si;acirc;n Evans
  Page 122-122
• Attribution is more likely to be demonstrated in more natural contexts 
  M. D. Matheson, M. Cooper, J. Weeks, R. Thompson and D. Fragaszy
  Page 124-126
• Methodologies, not method, for primate theory of mind 
  H. Lyn Miles and Warren P. Roberts
  Page 126-127
• Primate theory of mind is a Turing test 
  Robert W. Mitchell and James R. Anderson
  Page 127-128
• To see or not to see, that is the question: Designing experiments to test perspective-taking in nonhumans 
  Irene M. Pepperberg
  Page 128-129
• Primate cognitive neuroscience: What are the useful questions? 
  A. Parker
  Page 128-128
• Tactics in theory of mind research 
  Jesse E. Purdy and Michael Domjan
  Page 129-130
• Seeing is not (necessarily) believing 
  Virginia Slaughter and Linda Mealey
  Page 130-130
• Simpler for evolution: Secondary representation in apes, children, and ancestors 
  Thomas Suddendorf
  Page 131-131
• Precursors to theories of mind in nonhuman brains 
  Stephen F. Walker
  Page 131-132
• Triangulation, intervening variables, and experience projection 
  Andrew Whiten
  Page 132-133
• Liberalism, chauvinism, and experimental thought 
  C. M. Heyes
  Page 134-148
• The expectancies that govern the P300 amplitude are mostly automatic and unconscious 
  W. Sommer, H. Leuthold and J. Matt
  Page 149-150
• Toward an integration of P3 research with cognitive neuroscience 
  Rolf Verleger
  Page 150-152
• Context updating and the P300 
  Emanuel Donchin and Michael G. H. Coles
  Page 152-154
• Toward a neurology of grammar 
  T. Givon
  Page 154-155
• Greenfield on language, tools, and brain 
  Philip Swann
  Page 155-159
• Language, tools, and brain revisited 
  Patricia M. Greenfield
  Page 159-163
• Measuring accuracy is an intractable problem 
  Gillian Cohen
  Page 164-164
• Metaphorical pluralism ; not on the substantive level! 
  Benny Shanon
  Page 164-165
• Methodological and substantive implications of a metatheoretical distinction: More on correspondence versus storehouse metaphors of memory 
  Asher Koriat and Morris Goldsmith
  Page 165-168