Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Volume 21 : Issue 6

Table of Contents

• Finding out about filling-in: A guide to perceptual completion for visual science and the philosophy of perception 
  Luiz Pessoa, Evan Thompson and Alva No;euml;
  Page 723-748
• Analytic isomorphism and speech perception 
  Irene Appelbaum
  Page 748-749
• Filling-in as the phenomenal side of binding 
  Karl Frederick Arrington
  Page 749-749
• Filling-in as a within-level propagation may be an illusion 
  Talis Bachmann
  Page 749-750
• Prediction, inference, and the homunculus 
  Horace B. Barlow
  Page 750-751
• Dennett versus Gibson 
  Alex Byrne
  Page 751-752
• The functional effects of modal versus amodal filling-in 
  Greg Davis and Jon Driver
  Page 752-753
• No bridge over the stream of consciousness 
  Daniel C. Dennett
  Page 753-754
• Linking spread of neural activity and filling-in: A few more arguments in favor 
  Peter De Weerd
  Page 754-755
• Area, surface, and contour: Psychophysical correlates of three classes of pictorial completion 
  Birgitta Dresp
  Page 755-756
• Quasi-modal encounters of the third kind: The filling-in of visual detail 
  Frank H. Durgin
  Page 756-757
• On the roles of consciousness and representations in visual science 
  David C. Earle
  Page 757-758
• The level of filling-in and when it is cognitive 
  Richard L. Gregory
  Page 758-758
• Filling-in the forms 
  Stephen Grossberg
  Page 758-759
• Revising locus of the bridge between neuroscience and perception 
  L. W. Hahn
  Page 759-760
• Surface representation by population coding 
  Hidehiko Komatsu
  Page 761-762
• Blindsight in the blind spot 
  K. Kranda
  Page 762-763
• Gestalt isomorphism and the primacy of the subjective perceptual experience 
  Steven Lehar
  Page 763-764
• Representational theory emerges unscathed 
  Dennis Lomas
  Page 764-765
• A retinotopic representation of filling in: Further supporting evidence 
  Ikuya Murakami
  Page 765-766
• Representations, computation, and inverse ecological optics 
  Heiko Neumann
  Page 766-767
• Trading in form for content and taking the sting out of the mind-body problem 
  Erik Myin
  Page 766-766
• Visual perception and subjective visual awareness 
  Antti Revonsuo
  Page 769-770
• Filling-in while finding out: Guiding behavior by representing information 
  William D. Ross
  Page 770-771
• Filled-in sensations: The primordial species of imagery? 
  Kevin Sauv;eacute;
  Page 771-772
• Active vision and the basketball problem 
  Manish Singh and Donald D. Hoffman
  Page 772-773
• Spatiotemporal unit formation 
  Thomas F. Shipley
  Page 772-772
• How do we see what is not there? 
  Lothar Spillmann and John S. Werner
  Page 773-774
• In defense of neuro-perceptual isomorphism 
  Dejan Todorovi;cacute;
  Page 774-775
• The Cartesian Broadway 
  Christopher W. Tyler
  Page 775-776
• Analytical isomorphism and Marilyn Monroe 
  Robert Van Gulick
  Page 776-777
• Fully embodying the personal level 
  Francisco J. Varela and Pierre Vermersch
  Page 777-778
• Pathological completion: The blind leading the mind? 
  Robin Walker and Jason B. Mattingley
  Page 778-779
• Filling-in does require a mechanism, and some persistent doubts 
  Paul Whittle
  Page 779-780
• A task-oriented taxonomy of visual completion 
  Carol Yin
  Page 780-781
• Filling-in is for finding out 
  Luiz Pessoa, Evan Thompson and Alva No;euml;
  Page 781-796
• Processing capacity defined by relational complexity: Implications for comparative, developmental, and cognitive psychology 
  Graeme S. Halford, William H. Wilson and Steven Phillips
  Page 803-831
• ACT-R: A higher-level account of processing capacity 
  John R. Anderson, Christian Lebiere, Marsha Lovett and Lynne Reder
  Page 831-832
• Processing demands associated with relational complexity: Testing predictions with dual-task methodologies 
  Daniel B. Berch and Elizabeth J. Foley
  Page 832-833
• Synchronization of neural activity and information processing 
  Roman Borisyuk, Galina Borisyuk and Yakov Kazanovich
  Page 833-833
• On the psychological reality of parallel relational architectures: Whose knowledge system is it anyway? 
  Margaret Chalmers and Brendan McGonigle
  Page 833-834
• Discontinuity and variability in relational complexity: Cognitive and brain development 
  Donna Coch and Kurt W. Fischer
  Page 834-835
• What is more explanatory, processing capacity or processing speed? 
  Nelson Cowan
  Page 835-836
• Complexity: From formal analysis to final action 
  Douglas Frye and Philip David Zelazo
  Page 836-837
• Deep thinking in children: The case for knowledge change in analogical development 
  Dedre Gentner and Mary Jo Rattermann
  Page 837-838
• Is relational complexity a useful metric for cognitive development? 
  Usha Goswami
  Page 838-839
• Why is capacity limited? Missing dynamics and developmental controversies 
  Richard A. Heath and Brett K. Hayes
  Page 839-840
• Is multi-tasking complex? 
  W. Bentley MacLeod
  Page 840-841
• Is it processing capacity that is being defined? 
  David Navon
  Page 841-842
• Chaotic dimensionality of hand movements define processing capacity by relational complexity 
  Danko Nikolic
  Page 842-843
• To appraise developmental difficulty or mental demand, relational complexity is not enough 
  Juan Pascual-Leone
  Page 843-844
• Chunks, bindings, STAR, and Holographic Reduced Representations 
  Tony A. Plate
  Page 844-845
• Can we measure working memory without contamination from knowledge held in long-term memory? 
  John Sweller
  Page 845-846
• Relational complexity, the central executive, and prefrontal cortex 
  James A. Waltz, Barbara J. Knowlton and Keith J. Holyoak
  Page 846-847
• Relational complexity metric is effective when assessments are based on actual cognitive processes 
  Graeme S. Halford, William H. Wilson and Steven Phillips
  Page 848-860