Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Volume 22 : Issue 5

Table of Contents

• A theory of implicit and explicit knowledge 
  Zoltan Dienes and Josef Perner
  Page 735-808
• The developmental progression from implicit to explicit knowledge: A computational approach 
  Martha Wagner Alibali and Kenneth R. Koedinger
  Page 755-756
• Individuals, properties, and the explicitness hierarchy 
  Alex Barber
  Page 756-757
• Volitional control in the learning of artificial grammars 
  Peter A. Bibby and Geoffrey Underwood
  Page 757-758
• Time and the implicit-explicit continuum 
  Jill Boucher
  Page 758-759
• Unconscious motivation and phenomenal knowledge: Toward a comprehensive theory of implicit mental states 
  Robert F. Bornstein
  Page 758-758
• Implicit and explicit representations of visual space 
  Bruce Bridgeman
  Page 759-760
• Nonconceptual content and the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge 
  Ingar Brinck
  Page 760-761
• Implicit representation, mental states, and mental processes 
  Richard A. Carlson
  Page 761-762
• Explicitness and predication: A risky linkage 
  Andrew Carstairs-McCarthy
  Page 762-763
• Explicit representations in hypothetical thinking 
  Jonathan St. B. T. Evans and David E. Over
  Page 763-764
• Is factuality a matter of content? 
  Gregory Currie
  Page 763-763
• Conceptual multiplicity and structure 
  Norman R. Gall
  Page 764-765
• How does implicit and explicit knowledge fit in the consciousness of action? 
  Nicolas Georgieff and Yves Rossetti
  Page 765-766
• Does the hand reflect implicit knowledge? Yes and no 
  Susan Goldin-Meadow and Martha Wagner Alibali
  Page 766-767
• Implicit knowledge in engineering judgment and scientific reasoning 
  Michael E. Gorman
  Page 767-768
• The functional role of representations cannot explain basic implicit memory phenomena 
  Yonatan Goshen-Gottstein
  Page 768-769
• Implicit and explicit knowledge: One representational medium or many? 
  James A. Hampton
  Page 769-770
• Making implicit explicit: The role of learning 
  Bruce D. Homer and Jason T. Ramsay
  Page 770-770
• Fishing with the wrong nets: How the implicit slips through the Representational Theory of Mind 
  Luis Jim;eacute;nez and Axel Cleeremans
  Page 771-771
• Memorial states of awareness versus volitional control: The role of task differences 
  Sachiko Kinoshita
  Page 772-772
• Implicit and explicit learning in a hybrid architecture of cognition 
  Christian Lebiere and Dieter Wallach
  Page 772-773
• What is the cat in complex settings? 
  Pierre-Jean Marescaux and Patrick Chambres
  Page 773-774
• Applying a theory of implicit and explicit knowledge to memory research 
  Neil W. Mulligan
  Page 775-776
• Explicit factuality and comparative evidence 
  Shaun Nichols and Claudia Uller
  Page 776-777
• Explicit to whom? Accessibility, representational homogeneity, and dissociable learning mechanisms 
  David C. Noelle
  Page 777-778
• Knowledge by ignoring 
  Paul M. Pietroski and Susan J. Dwyer
  Page 781-781
• A developmental theory of implicit and explicit knowledge? 
  Diane Poulin-Dubois and David H. Rakison
  Page 782-782
• Some costs of over-assimilating data to the implicit/explicit distinction 
  Mark A. Sabbagh and Benjamin A. Clegg
  Page 783-784
• Applying the implicit-explicit distinction to development in children 
  Ted Ruffman
  Page 783-783
• Representation and knowledge are not the same thing 
  Leslie Smith
  Page 784-785
• Implicit versus explicit: An act-r learning perspective 
  Niels A. Taatgen
  Page 785-786
• Automatic processing results in conscious representations 
  Joseph Tzelgov, Dana Ganor and Vered Yehene
  Page 786-787
• Implicit knowledge as automatic, latent knowledge 
  John R. Vokey and Philip A. Higham
  Page 787-788
• Consciousness and control: The argument from developmental psychology 
  Philip David Zelazo and Douglas Frye
  Page 788-789
• Questioning explicit properties of implicit individuals in knowledge representation 
  Carmen E. Westerberg and Chad J. Marsolek
  Page 788-789
• Deconstructing RTK: How to explicate a theory of implicit knowledge 
  Josef Perner and Zoltan Dienes
  Page 790-801
• A neuron doctrine in the philosophy of neuroscience 
  Ian Gold and Daniel Stoljar
  Page 809-830
• The logic of interests in neuroscience 
  Leslie Brothers
  Page 831-832
• Biological neuroscience is only as radical as the evolution of mind 
  Terry Blumenthal and James Schirillo
  Page 831-831
• Levels of description and conflated doctrines 
  John A. Bullinaria
  Page 832-833
• Two radical neuron doctrines 
  Alex Byrne and David R. Hilbert
  Page 833-833
• Why biological neuroscience cannot replace psychology 
  Nick Chater
  Page 834-834
• Of skyhooks and the coevolution of scientific disciplines 
  Donald R. Franceschetti
  Page 836-837
• What neuron doctrines might never explain 
  Keith Gunderson
  Page 837-838
• The neuron doctrine is an insult to neurons 
  Stuart Hameroff
  Page 838-839
• Neuron doctrine: Trivial versus radical versus do not dichotomize 
  Barry Horwitz
  Page 839-840
• The nontrivial doctrine of cognitive neuroscience 
  Valerie Gray Hardcastle
  Page 839-839
• A slightly radical neuron doctrine 
  Frank Jackson
  Page 840-841
• Radical explanations, but trivial descriptions 
  Claus Lamm
  Page 842-843
• A more substantive neuron doctrine 
  Joe Y. F. Lau
  Page 843-844
• Supervenience and qualia 
  Ken Mogi
  Page 844-845
• Begging the question of causation in a critique of the neuron doctrine 
  
  Page 846-846
• The neuron doctrine in psychiatry 
  Christian Perring
  Page 846-847
• Neuroscience and the explanation of psychological phenomena 
  Antti Revonsuo
  Page 847-849
• Neural circuits and block diagrams 
  J. J. C. Smart
  Page 849-849
• Autonomous psychology and the moderate neuron doctrine 
  Tony Stone and Martin Davies
  Page 849-850
• Taking the trivial doctrine seriously: Functionalism, eliminativism, and materialism 
  Maurizio Tirassa
  Page 851-852
• Let us keep our ontology and epistemology separate! 
  William R. Uttal
  Page 852-853
• Synaptic plasticity is complex; neurobiologists are not 
  Richard M. Vickery
  Page 853-854
• Playing with words, working with concepts, testing ideas 
  J. M. Zanker
  Page 855-855
• Difficulties in interpretation associated with substitution failure 
  Eric Zarahn
  Page 855-856
• Interpreting neuroscience and explaining the mind 
  Ian Gold and Daniel Stoljar
  Page 856-866
• Pr;cis of Lifelines: Biology, freedom, determinism 
  Steven Rose
  Page 871-885
• The myth of genetic determinism ; again 
  John Alcock
  Page 885-886
• The science of life as seen through Rose-coloured glasses 
  Mike Anderson
  Page 886-887
• A clash of competing metaphors 
  Michael Bradie
  Page 887-887
• What the human annals tell us 
  Gwen J. Broude
  Page 888-888
• No short cuts to science 
  Bruce G. Charlton
  Page 889-889
• Metabolic complexity has no bearing on genetic determinism 
  Athel Cornish-Bowden
  Page 889-890
• Behavioral neurogenetics beyond determinism 
  Wim E. Crusio
  Page 890-891
• Stability of behavioral traits within the framework of neural plasticity 
  Richard A. Depue
  Page 891-892
• Multidetermination 
  Judith Economos
  Page 892-893
• Neurogenetic determinism is a theological doctrine 
  Walter J. Freeman
  Page 893-894
• Is the lifeliner objectively free? 
  Steve Fuller
  Page 894-895
• Rose succeeds where Wilson fails 
  Jerry Hirsch
  Page 895-896
• Genetic and biological determinants of psychological traits 
  Colin Martindale
  Page 897-898
• Some misunderstandings and misinterpretations about sociobiology and behavior genetics in Lifelines by Steven Rose 
  Stephen C. Maxson
  Page 898-899
• A holistic developmental theory requires better research techniques 
  George F. Michel
  Page 899-900
• Determinism, omniscience, and the multiplicity of explanations 
  Mary Midgley
  Page 900-901
• Biological determinism versus the concept of a person 
  Robert Miller
  Page 901-902
• Facing complexity: Against scientific oversimplification 
  Guenther Palm
  Page 902-903
• Extrapolated lifelines 
  T. E. Rowell
  Page 903-903
• Psychology and sociology: Beyond neither determinism nor science 
  Carmi Schooler
  Page 903-904
• Hierarchical approach to replication and selection 
  Alexei A. Sharov
  Page 905-906
• Cognitive and psychiatric science beyond determinism 
  Dan J. Stein
  Page 906-907
• Lifelines to a sinking cause 
  H. Dieter Steklis
  Page 907-909
• Autopoiesis and Lifelines: The importance of origins 
  Evan Thompson and Francisco J. Varela
  Page 909-910
• High purpose, low execution 
  Nicholas S. Thompson
  Page 910-911
• How to alienate your natural allies and attract your enemies 
  J. Richard Udry
  Page 911-911
• Biological determinism lives and needs refutation despite denials 
  Steven Rose
  Page 912-918