Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Volume 22 : Issue 6

Table of Contents

• Color, consciousness, and the isomorphism constraint 
  Stephen E. Palmer
  Page 923-943
• How to compare color sensations in different brains 
  Werner Backhaus
  Page 944-945
• Jack and Jill have shifted spectra 
  Ned Block
  Page 946-947
• Scaling the metaphorical brick wall 
  Michael Bradie
  Page 947-948
• A wiring demon meets socialized humans and calibrated photometers 
  Michael H. Brill
  Page 948-949
• Why asymmetries in color space cannot save functionalism 
  Jonathan Cohen
  Page 950-950
• Intrinsic changes in experience: Swift and enormous 
  Daniel C. Dennett
  Page 951-951
• What does my eye tell your mind? 
  Rebecca M. Frumkina
  Page 951-952
• Empirical assessment of colour symmetries 
  Lewis D. Griffin
  Page 952-953
• Color relations and the power of complexity 
  C. L. Hardin
  Page 953-954
• Logical possibility and the isomorphism constraint 
  Bernard Harrison
  Page 954-955
• If not functionalism, then what? Eliminative materialism? 
  Harry Howard
  Page 955-956
• Disorder of colour consciousness: The view from neuropsychology 
  Glyn W. Humphreys and M. Jane Riddoch
  Page 956-957
• Overlooking the resources of functionalism? 
  Zolt;amp;aacute;n Jakab
  Page 957-957
• Asymmetries in the distribution of composite and derived basic color categories 
  Paul Kay
  Page 957-958
• The inverted colour space of vampires 
  Karel Kranda
  Page 959-959
• Isomorphisms and subjective colors 
  Gregory R. Lockhead and Scott A. Huettel
  Page 959-960
• Asymmetry among Hering primaries thwarts the Inverted spectrum argument 
  Robert E. MacLaury
  Page 960-961
• Neurophenomenological constraints and pushing back the subjectivity barrier 
  Bruce MacLennan
  Page 961-963
• Consciousness ; subject to agreement 
  Neil Law Malcolm
  Page 963-964
• Beyond intrinsicness and dazzling blacks 
  Erik Myin
  Page 964-965
• Normal, pseudonormal, and color-blind vision: Cases of justified phenomenal belief 
  Martine Nida-R;amp;uuml;melin
  Page 965-965
• Finding a place for experience in the physical-relational structure of the brain 
  Jonathan Opie
  Page 966-967
• One basic or two? A rhapsody in blue 
  Galina V. Paramei
  Page 967-967
• An externalist approach to understanding color experience 
  Peter W. Ross
  Page 968-969
• One machine among many 
  Barbara Saunders
  Page 969-970
• Computation, levels of abstraction, and the intrinsic character of experience 
  
  Page 970-971
• Consciousness and introspection: How we get to know the inner world 
  John Smythies
  Page 971-972
• Sensory holism and functionalism 
  Joseph Thomas Tolliver
  Page 972-973
• Whatever seems right to me is right 
  J. van Brakel
  Page 973-973
• Out of sight but not out of mind: Isomorphism and absent qualia 
  Robert Van Gulick
  Page 974-974
• The possibility of subisomorphic experiential differences 
  Christopher D. Viger
  Page 975-975
• Isomorphism: Philosophical implications 
  Edmond Wright
  Page 975-976
• On qualia, relations, and structure in color experience 
  Stephen E. Palmer
  Page 976-985
• Lexical entries and rules of language: A multidisciplinary study of German inflection 
  Harald Clahsen
  Page 991-1013
• And what about the Chinese? 
  Heike Behrens and Michael Tomasello
  Page 1014-1014
• Productivity and exponence 
  James P. Blevins
  Page 1015-1016
• Lexical storage and regular processes 
  Geert Booij
  Page 1016-1016
• Use impacts morphological representation 
  Joan Bybee
  Page 1016-1017
• Investigating lexical entries and rules: A typological perspective 
  Greville G. Corbett
  Page 1019-1020
• Why collapse morphological concepts? 
  Wolfgang U. Dressler
  Page 1021-1021
• Pitfalls in tracking the psychological reality of lexically based and rule-based inflection 
  Etta Drews
  Page 1022-1023
• Diachronic evidence for a dual-mechanism approach to inflection 
  David Fertig
  Page 1023-1024
• The dual-route account of German: Where it is not a schema theory, it is probably wrong 
  Ulrike Hahn
  Page 1024-1025
• Some problems with the lexical status of nondefault inflection 
  Peter Indefrey
  Page 1025-1025
• The place of analogy in Minimalist Morphology and the irregularity of regular forms 
  Dirk P. Janssen
  Page 1025-1026
• The dual-mechanism model of inflectional morphology: A connectionist critique 
  Marc F. Joanisse and Todd R. Haskell
  Page 1026-1027
• Syntax, or, the embryogenesis of meaning 
  Paul J. M. Jorion
  Page 1027-1028
• Regular versus irregular inflection: A question of levels 
  Alessandro Laudanna
  Page 1029-1030
• Atomic lexical entries 
  David Lightfoot
  Page 1029-1030
• Hungarian cross-modal priming and treatment of nonsense words supports the dual-process hypothesis 
  
  Page 1030-1031
• Are rules and entries enough? Historical reflections on a longstanding controversy 
  Brigitte Nerlich and David D. Clarke
  Page 1032-1033
• On the cross-linguistic validity of a dual-mechanism model 
  Margherita Orsolini
  Page 1033-1035
• Please mind the brain, and brain the mind! 
  Friedemann Pulverm;amp;uuml;ller
  Page 1035-1036
• The power of cross-linguistic analysis: A key tool for developing explanatory models of human language 
  Lynn Santelmann
  Page 1036-1037
• Rules or neural networks? 
  Helmut Schnelle
  Page 1037-1038
• Rules and rote: Beyond the linguistic either-or fallacy 
  Robert Schreuder, Nivja de Jong, Andrea Krott and Harald Baayen
  Page 1038-1039
• Entries and operations: The great divide and the pitfalls of form frequency 
  Joan Sereno, Pienie Zwitserlood and Allard Jongman
  Page 1039-1039
• Inflectional classes, defaults, and syncretisms 
  Andrew Spencer
  Page 1040-1040
• The functional neuroanatomy of inflectional morphology 
  Michael T. Ullman
  Page 1041-1042
• Single mechanism but not single route: Learning verb inflections in constructivist neural networks 
  Gert Westermann
  Page 1042-1043
• On default rules and other rules 
  Richard Wiese
  Page 1043-1044
• German noun plural reconsidered 
  Dieter Wunderlich
  Page 1044-1045
• Dissociation between regular and irregular in connectionist architectures: Two processes, but still no special linguistic rules 
  Marco Zorzi and Gabriella Vigliocco
  Page 1045-1046
• The dual nature of the language faculty 
  Harald Clahsen
  Page 1046-1055