Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Volume 24 : Issue 5

Table of Contents

• Toward an interpretation of dynamic neural activity in terms of chaotic dynamical systems 
  Ichiro Tsuda
  Page 793-810
• Toward an interpretation of dynamic neural activity in terms of chaotic dynamical systems 
  Ichiro Tsuda
  Page 793-810
• Chaotic neurons and analog computation 
  Kazuyuki Aihara and Jun Kyung Ryeu
  Page 810-811
• The roles played by external input and synaptic modulations in the dynamics of neuronal systems 
  Arunava Banerjee
  Page 811-812
• The puzzle of chaotic neurodynamics 
  Roman Borisyuk
  Page 812-813
• Symmetries and itineracy in nonlinear systems with many degrees of freedom 
  Michael Breakspear and Karl Friston
  Page 813-813
• Multiple and variant time scales in dynamic information processing 
  Hubert R. Dinse
  Page 814-814
• How to construct a brain theory? 
  Pter rdi
  Page 815-815
• Cantor coding and chaotic itinerancy: Relevance for episodic memory, amnesia, and the hippocampus? 
  Jonathan K. Foster
  Page 815-816
• Noise-driven attractor landscapes for perception by mesoscopic brain dynamics 
  Walter J. Freeman
  Page 816-817
• Control of chaos and memory dynamics 
  Richard A. Heath
  Page 817-818
• Chaotic itinerancy needs embodied cognition to explain memory dynamics 
  Takashi Ikegami and Jun Tani
  Page 818-819
• Chaotic itinerancy: Insufficient perceptual evidence 
  Leslie M. Kay
  Page 819-820
• The noise of chaos 
  Zbigniew J. Kowalik
  Page 820-820
• Fragmented attractor boundaries in the KIII model of sensory information processing: A potential evidence of Cantor encoding in cognitive processes 
  Robert Kozma
  Page 820-821
• How (dis)ordered is our brain? 
  Hans Liljenstrm
  Page 821-822
• Network stabilization on unstable manifolds: Computing with middle layer transients 
  Arnold J. Mandell and Karen A. Selz
  Page 822-823
• Low-dimensional versus high-dimensional chaos in brain function is it an and/or issue? 
  Mrk Molnr
  Page 823-824
• Learning and control with chaos: From biology to robotics 
  Mathias Quoy, Jean-Paul Banquet and Emmanuel Dauc
  Page 824-825
• Chaos and neural coding: Is the binding problem a pseudo-problem? 
  Antonino Raffone and Cees van Leeuwen
  Page 826-827
• Dynamic neural activity as chaotic itinerancy or heteroclinic cycles? 
  Donald L. Rowe
  Page 827-828
• Using experimental data and analysis in EEG modelling 
  Donald L. Rowe and James Wright
  Page 828-829
• The plausibility of a chaotic brain theory 
  Ichiro Tsuda
  Page 829-840
• The Theory of Event Coding (TEC): A framework for perception and action planning 
  Bernhard Hommel, Jochen Msseler, Gisa Aschersleben and Wolfgang Prinz
  Page 849-878
• Intelligent control requires more structure than the Theory of Event Coding provides 
  Joanna Bryson
  Page 878-879
• A common framework for perception and action: Neuroimaging evidence 
  Thierry Chaminade and Jean Decety
  Page 879-882
• Perception, action planning, and cognitive maps 
  Eric Chown, Lashon B. Booker and Stephen Kaplan
  Page 882-882
• Common codes for situated interaction 
  Paul Cisek and John F. Kalaska
  Page 883-884
• Unifying by binding: Will binding really bind? 
  Jrn Diedrichsen and Eliot Hazeltine
  Page 884-885
• Modified action as a determinant of adult and age-related sensorimotor integration: Where does it begin? 
  Hubert R. Dinse
  Page 885-886
• Event coding as feature guessing: The lessons of the motor theory of speech perception 
  Bruno Galantucci, Carol A. Fowler and M. T. Turvey
  Page 886-887
• A common framework for language comprehension and language production? 
  Robert J. Hartsuiker and Martin J. Pickering
  Page 887-888
• TEC Some problems and some prospects 
  Julian Hochberg
  Page 888-889
• Attending, intending, and the importance of task settings 
  Jason Ivanoff and Raymond Klein
  Page 889-890
• The Theory of Event Coding (TEC)s framework may leave perception out of the picture 
  J. Scott Jordan
  Page 890-890
• Ecological information and prospective control without mental representation 
  Nam-Gyoon Kim and Judith A. Effken
  Page 890-891
• Exploring the hyphen in ideo-motor action 
  Wilfried Kunde
  Page 891-892
• The CHREST model of active perception and its role in problem solving 
  Peter C. R. Lane, Peter C-H. Cheng and Fernand Gobet
  Page 892-893
• Event coding, executive control, and task-switching 
  Nachshon Meiran
  Page 893-894
• A theory of representation to complement TEC 
  Ruth Garrett Millikan
  Page 894-895
• Anomalous processing in schizophrenia suggests adaptive event-action coding requires multiple executive brain mechanisms 
  Robert D. Oades and Katja Kreul
  Page 895-896
• The role of feedforward control in motor planning 
  Marta Olivetti Belardinelli and Demis Basso
  Page 896-897
• Theory of event coding: Interesting, but underspecified 
  Chris Oriet, Biljana Stevanovski and Pierre Jolicoeur
  Page 897-898
• Perception, action, and motor control: Interaction does not necessarily imply common structures 
  L. Pisella, A. Kritikos and Y. Rossetti
  Page 898-899
• TEC: Integrated view of perception and action or framework for response selection? 
  Robert W. Proctor and Kim-Phuong L. Vu
  Page 899-900
• The TEC as a theory of embodied cognition 
  Daniel C. Richardson and Michael J. Spivey
  Page 900-901
• The event-code: Not the solution to a problem, but a problem to be solved 
  Michael J. Richardson and Claire F. Michaels
  Page 901-902
• Computational motor planning and the theory of event coding 
  David A. Rosenbaum
  Page 902-903
• How specific and common is common coding? 
  Andries F. Sanders
  Page 903-905
• Explanatory burdens and natural law: Invoking a field description of perception-action 
  Robert E. Shaw and Jeffrey B. Wagman
  Page 905-906
• Multi-level sensorimotor interactions 
  Stefan Vogt and Heiko Hecht
  Page 906-907
• Perception and action planning: Getting it together 
  David A. Westwood and Melvyn A. Goodale
  Page 907-908
• How are events represented? 
  Gezinus Wolters and Antonino Raffone
  Page 908-909
• Scaling up from atomic to complex events 
  Jeffrey M. Zacks
  Page 909-910
• Codes and their vicissitudes 
  Bernhard Hommel, Jochen Msseler, Gisa Aschersleben and Wolfgang Prinz
  Page 910-926
• A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness 
  J. Kevin ORegan and Alva No
  Page 939-973
• Editorial commentary 
  Stevan Harnad
  Page 973-974
• Visual conscious perception could be grounded in a nonconscious sensorimotor domain 
  Ulrich Ansorge, Ingrid Scharlau, Manfred Heumann and Werner Klotz
  Page 974-975
• Visual awareness relies on exogenous orienting of attention: Evidence from unilateral neglect 
  Paolo Bartolomeo and Sylvie Chokron
  Page 975-976
• The role of the brain in perception 
  Paul Bach-y-Rita and Steven J. Hasse
  Page 975-975
• Three experiments to test the sensorimotor theory of vision 
  Susan J. Blackmore
  Page 977-977
• Behaviorism revisited 
  Ned Block
  Page 977-978
• Experience, attention, and mental representation 
  Justin Broackes
  Page 978-979
• Sensorimotor chauvinism? 
  Andy Clark and Josefa Toribio
  Page 979-980
• Whither visual representations? Whither qualia? 
  Jonathan Cohen
  Page 980-981
• Trans-saccadic representation makes your Porsche go places 
  Peter De Graef, Karl Verfaillie, Filip Germeys, Veerle Gysen and Caroline Van Eccelpoel
  Page 981-982
• Misperceptions dependent on oculomotor activity 
  Burkhart Fischer
  Page 982-983
• Surprise, surprise 
  Daniel C. Dennett
  Page 982-982
• Mirror neurons: A sensorimotor representation system 
  Vittorio Gallese and Christian Keysers
  Page 983-984
• Real action in a virtual world 
  Melvyn A. Goodale
  Page 984-985
• Visual perception is not visual awareness 
  Valerie Gray Hardcastle
  Page 985-985
• In the Minds Eye: Perceptual coupling and sensorimotor contingencies 
  Julian Hochberg
  Page 986-986
• Doing it my way: Sensation, perception and feeling red 
  Nicholas Humphrey
  Page 987-987
• The role of eye movements in perception 
  Nam-Gyoon Kim
  Page 988-990
• How do we account for the absence of change deafness? 
  Frdric Isel
  Page 988-988
• Consciousness as action: The eliminativist sirens are calling 
  Martin Kurthen
  Page 990-991
• Does sensorimotor contingency theory account for perceptual-motor dissociations? 
  Francesco Lacquaniti and Myrka Zago
  Page 991-992
• On the distinction between sensorimotor and motorsensory contingencies 
  Donald Laming
  Page 992-992
• Does functionalism really deal with the phenomenal side of experience? 
  Riccardo Manzotti and Giulio Sandini
  Page 993-994
• Attention sheds no light on the origin of phenomenal experience 
  Victor A. F. Lamme and Rogier Landman
  Page 993-993
• Sensorimotor contingencies do not replace internal representations, and mastery is not necessary for perception 
  Ernst Niebur
  Page 994-995
• A sensory-attentional account of speech perception 
  Howard C. Nusbaum, Jeremy I. Skipper and Steven L. Small
  Page 995-996
• The explanatory gap is still there 
  Klaus Oberauer
  Page 996-997
• Sins of omission and commission 
  Gerard OBrien and Jon Opie
  Page 997-998
• Perceptual theories that emphasize action are necessary but not sufficient 
  John R. Pani
  Page 998-998
• Seeing, acting, and knowing 
  Zenon W. Pylyshyn
  Page 999-999
• Neural correlates of consciousness are not pictorial representations 
  Geraint Rees and Chris Frith
  Page 999-1000
• Dreaming and the place of consciousness in nature 
  Antti Revonsuo
  Page 1000-1001
• The sensorimotor contingency of multisensory localization correlates with the conscious percept of spatial unity 
  Gwendolyn E. Roberson, Mark T. Wallace and James A. Schirillo
  Page 1001-1002
• The existence of internal visual memory representations 
  Jennifer D. Ryan and Neal J. Cohen
  Page 1002-1003
• Reexamining visual cognition in human infants: On the necessity of representation 
  Matthew Schlesinger
  Page 1003-1004
• Change blindness, Gibson, and the sensorimotor theory of vision 
  Brian J. Scholl and Daniel J. Simons
  Page 1004-1006
• The absence of representations causes inconsistencies in visual perception 
  Jeroen B. J. Smeets and Eli Brenner
  Page 1006-1006
• Re-presenting the case for representation 
  Benjamin W. Tatler
  Page 1006-1007
• Still room for representations 
  Robert Van Gulick
  Page 1007-1008
• In search of the ultimate evidence: The fastest visual reaction adapts to environment, not retinal locations 
  Boris M. Velichkovsky and Sebastian Pannasch
  Page 1008-1009
• Perceptions as hypotheses of the outside world 
  Veijo Virsu and Simo Vanni
  Page 1009-1010
• A non-epistemic, non-pictorial, internal, material visual field 
  Edmond Wright
  Page 1010-1011
• Acting out our sensory experience 
  J. Kevin ORegan and Alva No
  Page 1011-1021