Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Volume 25 : Issue 1

Table of Contents

• Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases 
  Stephanie D. Preston and Frans B. M. de Waal
  Page 1-20
• Hyperbolic discounting lets empathy be a motivated process 
  George Ainslie and John Monterosso
  Page 20-21
• The role of empathy in the formation and maintenance of social bonds 
  Cameron Anderson and Dacher Keltner
  Page 21-22
• Emotion-specific clues to the neural substrate of empathy 
  Anthony P. Atkinson
  Page 22-23
• Empathy as a special case of emotional mediation of social behavior 
  Filippo Aureli and Colleen M. Schaffner
  Page 23-24
• Reflexive empathy: On predicting more than has ever been observed 
  Albert Bandura
  Page 24-25
• Developmental processes in empathy 
  Kim A. Bard
  Page 25-26
• Empathy: Common sense, science sense, wolves, and well-being 
  Marc Bekoff
  Page 26-27
• Empathy: A unitary circuit or a set of dissociable neuro-cognitive systems? 
  James R. Blair and Karina S. Perschardt
  Page 27-28
• Peers, cooperative play, and the development of empathy in children 
  Celia A. Brownell, Stephanie Zerwas and Geetha Balaram
  Page 28-29
• Understanding the imitation deficit in autism may lead to a more specific model of autism as an empathy disorder 
  Tony Charman
  Page 29-30
• A complete theory of empathy must consider stage changes 
  Michael Lamport Commons and Chester Arnold Wolfsont
  Page 30-31
• Deconstructing empathy 
  John N. Constantino
  Page 31-32
• Too early for a neuropsychology of empathy 
  Hank Davis
  Page 32-33
• Distinctions among various modes of empathy-related reactions: A matter of importance in humans 
  Nancy Eisenberg
  Page 33-34
• Emotional and cognitive processing in empathy and moral behavior 
  Paul J. Eslinger, Jorge Moll and Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza
  Page 34-35
• The mirror matching system: A shared manifold for intersubjectivity 
  Vittorio Gallese, Pier Francesco Ferrari and Maria Alessandra Umilt
  Page 35-36
• Cognitive empathy presupposes self-awareness: Evidence from phylogeny, ontogeny, neuropsychology, and mental illness 
  Gordon G. Gallup and Steven M. Platek
  Page 36-37
• Emotion: The relation between breadth of definition and explanatory power 
  Robert A. Hinde
  Page 37-38
• Empathy, simulation, and PAM 
  Robert M. Gordon
  Page 37-37
• How automatic and representational is empathy, and why 
  Martin L. Hoffman
  Page 38-39
• Mirror neurons, the insula, and empathy 
  Marco Iacoboni and Gian Luigi Lenzi
  Page 39-40
• Elucidation of the brain correlates of cognitive empathy and self-awareness 
  Julian Paul Keenan and Mark A. Wheeler
  Page 40-41
• Similarity versus familiarity: When empathy becomes selfish 
  Elias L. Khalil
  Page 41-41
• The Perception-Action Model of empathy and psychopathic cold-heartedness 
  Linda Mealey and Stuart Kinner
  Page 42-43
• Empathy requires the development of the self 
  Michael Lewis
  Page 42-42
• Empathy and the action-perception resonances of basic socio-emotional systems of the brain 
  Jaak Panksepp, Nakia Gordon and Jeff Burgdorf
  Page 43-44
• Understanding others emotions: From affective resonance to empathic action 
  Lisa A. Parr
  Page 44-45
• Various kinds of empathy as revealed by the developing child, not the monkeys brain 
  Philippe Rochat
  Page 45-46
• Psychobiological basis of empathy 
  Jay Schulkin
  Page 46-47
• Perception-action links and the evolution of human speech exchange 
  Thomas P. Wilson and Margaret Wilson
  Page 47-48
• Caregiving, emotion, and concern for others 
  Carolyn Zahn-Waxler
  Page 48-49
• Empathy: Each is in the right hopefully, not all in the wrong 
  Stephanie D. Preston and Frans B. M. de Waal
  Page 49-58
• Two visual systems and two theories of perception: An attempt to reconcile the constructivist and ecological approaches 
  Joel Norman
  Page 73-96
• Are the dorsal/ventral pathways sufficiently distinct to resolve perceptual theory? 
  George J. Andersen
  Page 96-97
• When is movement controlled by the dorsal stream? 
  Gordon Binsted and Les G. Carlton
  Page 97-98
• A better understanding of inference can reconcile constructivist and direct theories 
  Myron L. Braunstein
  Page 99-99
• Conceptual space as a connection between the constructivist and the ecological approaches in a robot vision system 
  Antonio Chella
  Page 100-101
• Two visual systems but only one theory of perception 
  Darren Burke and William G. Hayward
  Page 100-100
• Perception, learning, and judgment in ecological psychology: Who needs a constructivist ventral system? 
  Clinton Cooper and Claire F. Michaels
  Page 101-102
• Invariants and cues 
  James E. Cutting
  Page 102-103
• Ecological and constructivist approaches and the influence of illusions 
  Denise D. J. de Grave, Jeroen B. J. Smeets and Eli Brenner
  Page 103-104
• Evolutionary and intellectual antecedents of primate visual processing streams 
  Colin G. Ellard
  Page 104-105
• A fast ventral stream or early dorsal-ventral interactions? 
  Digby Elliott, Luc Tremblay and Timothy N. Welsh
  Page 105-105
• Constructivist and ecological approaches in tactual perception 
  Edouard Gentaz, Yvette Hatwell and Arlette Streri
  Page 106-106
• Recognising actions 
  Patrick R. Green and Frank E. Pollick
  Page 106-107
• Direct information on the cutting room floor 
  Julian Hochberg
  Page 107-108
• A wider view of the spatial mode of vision 
  David Ingle
  Page 108-110
• On invariant-sensitive graspers and cue-sensitive perceivers 
  Frederick A. A. Kingdom
  Page 110-110
• The primacy of ecological realism 
  William M. Mace
  Page 111-111
• The dual route hypothesis in visual cognition: Why a developmental approach is necessary 
  Denis Mareschal and Jordy Kaufman
  Page 111-112
• One visual system with two interacting visual streams 
  Jason S. McCarley and Gregory J. DiGirolamo
  Page 112-113
• Where does perception end and when does action start? 
  Dennis J. McFarland
  Page 113-113
• Two theories of perception: Internal consistency, separability and interaction between processing modes 
  James G. Phillips, James W. Meehan and Tom J. Triggs
  Page 114-115
• The dorsal system and the ecological self 
  Ulric Neisser
  Page 114-114
• The ventral stream offers more affordance and the dorsal stream more memory than believed 
  Albert Postma, Rob van der Lubbe and Sander Zuidhoek
  Page 115-116
• Berkeley, Helmholtz, the moon illusion, and two visual systems 
  Helen E. Ross
  Page 116-117
• Integrating constructivist and ecological approaches 
  Wayne Shebilske
  Page 117-118
• Two visual systems must still perceive events 
  J. Alex Shull and Geoffrey P. Bingham
  Page 118-119
• Normans dual model in a broader context 
  Frederick Toates
  Page 119-120
• On the development of the two visual systems 
  John van der Kamp and Geert J. P. Savelsbergh
  Page 120-120
• Adequacy and utility of the dual-process approach to perception: Time (and research) will tell 
  Joel Norman
  Page 121-137
• The relationship between object manipulation and language development in Brocas area: A connectionist simulation of Greenfields hypothesis 
  Ronan G. Reilly
  Page 145-153
• Authors Response 
  Patricia M. Greenfield
  Page 153-154