Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Volume 25 : Issue 6

Table of Contents

• The cognitive functions of language 
  Peter Carruthers
  Page 657-674
• A metamodule for conceptual integration: Language or theory of mind? 
  Scott Atran
  Page 674-675
• The collective invention of language to access the universe of possible ideas 
  Roy F. Baumeister and Kathleen D. Vohs
  Page 675-676
• Domain-generality and the relative pronoun 
  Jos Luis Bermudez
  Page 676-677
• Language in the modular mind? Its a no-brainer! 
  Derek Bickerton
  Page 677-678
• You dont say: Figurative language and thought 
  Gregory A. Bryant and Raymond W. Gibbs
  Page 678-679
• Language isnt quite that special 
  Joanna J. Bryson
  Page 679-680
• Is LF really a linguistic level? 
  Nick Chater
  Page 680-680
• Anchors not inner codes, coordination not translation (and hold the modules please) 
  Andy Clark
  Page 681-681
• A linguistic module for integrating the senses, or a house of cards? 
  Rick Dale and Michael Spivey
  Page 681-682
• Why not LF for false belief reasoning? 
  Jill G. de Villiers and Peter A. de Villiers
  Page 682-683
• Cross-domain thinking: Common representation format or generalized mapping process? 
  Peter F. Dominey
  Page 683-684
• The role of language in the dual process theory of thinking 
  Jonathan St. B. T. Evans and David E. Over
  Page 684-685
• Language, consciousness, and cross-modular thought 
  Keith Frankish
  Page 685-686
• Inner speech and the meeting of the minds 
  William Frawley
  Page 686-687
• No conceptual thought without language 
  Christopher Gauker
  Page 687-687
• Language role in enabling abstract, logical thought 
  James A. Hampton
  Page 688-688
• Relativistic implications of a natural-language-based format for thought 
  Steve Henser
  Page 688-689
• Viewing cognitive mechanisms in the context of biology 
  Linda Hermer-Vazquez
  Page 689-690
• The problematic transition from specific competences to general competence 
  James R. Hurford and Jean-Louis Dessalles
  Page 690-691
• How perspective shift integrates thought 
  Brian MacWhinney
  Page 691-692
• Could you think Carruthers ideas without having to speak them? Talk with yourself if you want to have any thought on that 
  Carlos Molina
  Page 692-693
• Developing dual-representation processes 
  Katherine Nelson
  Page 693-694
• Internalizing communication 
  Gerard OBrien and Jon Opie
  Page 694-695
• Speech as an opportunistic vehicle of thinking 
  Csaba Plh
  Page 695-696
• What domain integration could not be 
  Philip Robbins
  Page 696-697
• The spatial reorientation data do not support the thesis that language is the medium of cross-modular thought 
  Richard Samuels
  Page 697-698
• Bilingual inner speech as the medium of cross-modular retrieval in autobiographical memory 
  Robert W. Schrauf
  Page 698-699
• Talking to ourselves: The intelligibility of inner speech 
  Peter P. Slezak
  Page 699-700
• What language is mentalese? 
  Dan I. Slobin
  Page 700-701
• Conjoining information from different modules: A comparative perspective 
  Giorgio Vallortigara and Valeria Anna Sovrano
  Page 701-702
• Language, cognition, and the nature of modularity: Evidence from aphasia 
  Rosemary Varley and Michael Siegal
  Page 702-703
• The role of working memory in skilled and conceptual thought 
  Thomas Wynn and Fred Coolidge
  Page 703-704
• Language and conceptual development: Words as essence placeholders 
  Fei Xu
  Page 704-705
• Modularity, language, and the flexibility of thought 
  Peter Carruthers
  Page 705-719
• Are developmental disorders like cases of adult brain damage? Implications from connectionist modelling 
  Michael Thomas and Annette Karmiloff-Smith
  Page 727-750
• The beauty of models for developmental disorders 
  J. Briscoe
  Page 750-752
• Raising the bar for connectionist modeling of cognitive developmental disorders 
  Morten H. Christiansen, Christopher M. Conway and Michelle R. Ellefson
  Page 752-753
• The residual normality assumption and models of cognition in schizophrenia 
  Ruth Condray and Stuart R. Steinhauer
  Page 753-754
• Two closely related simulations provide weak limits on Residual Normality 
  Richard P. Cooper
  Page 754-755
• Development is also experienced by a personal self who is shaped by culture 
  Michel Ferrari
  Page 755-756
• Modularity in developmental disorders: Evidence from Specific Language Impairment and peripheral dyslexias 
  Naama Friedmann and Aviah Gvion
  Page 756-757
• Nativism, neuroconstructivism, and developmental disorder 
  Philip Gerrans
  Page 757-758
• Distinguishing proximal from distal causes is useful and compatible with accounts of compensatory processing in developmental disorders of cognition 
  Nancy Ewald Jackson and Max Coltheart
  Page 758-759
• Encapsulating architecture and encapsulating processes 
  Patrick Juola
  Page 759-759
• Did Residual Normality ever have a chance? 
  Susan C. Levine, Terry Regier and Tracy L. Solomon
  Page 759-760
• Structural abnormality may not equal functional oddity 
  Yonata Levy
  Page 760-761
• Coconstructed functionality instead of functional normality 
  Shu-Chen Li and Ulman Lindenberger
  Page 761-762
• What can developmental disorders tell us about modularity? 
  Gary F. Marcus
  Page 762-763
• Double dissociations never license simple inferences about underlying brain organization, especially in developmental cases 
  James L. McClelland and Gary Lupyan
  Page 763-764
• Weak evidence for a strong case against modularity in developmental disorders 
  Ralph-Axel Mller
  Page 764-765
• The best is yet to come: The promise of models of developmental disorders 
  Yuko Munakata, Jamie O. Edgin and Jennifer Merva Stedron
  Page 765-766
• Residual Normality and the issue of language profiles in Williams syndrome 
  Csaba Plh, gnes Lukcs and Mihly Racsmny
  Page 766-767
• Evidence for a domain-specific deficit in developmental dyslexia 
  Franck Ramus
  Page 767-768
• Are developmental disabilities the same in children and adults? 
  Paula Tallal
  Page 768-769
• How connectionist simulations fail to account for developmental disorders in children 
  Christine Temple and Harald Clahsen
  Page 769-770
• Models of atypical development must also be models of normal development 
  Gert Westermann and Denis Mareschal
  Page 771-772
• The developmental cognitive neuroscience approach to the study of developmental disorders 
  Elise Temple
  Page 771-771
• Residual normality: Friend or foe? 
  Michael Thomas and Annette Karmiloff-Smith
  Page 772-780