Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Volume 26 : Issue 3

Table of Contents

• Significant uncertainty is common in nature 
  Donald R. Griffin
  Page 246-246
• The neural basis of predicate-argument structure 
  James R. Hurford
  Page 261-283
• Probability rather than logic as the basis of perception 
  Thomas J. Anastasio
  Page 283-284
• Prelinguistic agents will form only egocentric representations 
  Michael L. Anderson and Tim Oates
  Page 284-285
• Predicates: External description or neural reality? 
  Michael A. Arbib
  Page 285-286
• Afferent isnt efferent, and language isnt logic, either 
  Derek Bickerton
  Page 286-287
• The objects of attention: Causes and targets 
  Ingar Brinck
  Page 287-288
• Grammar originates in action planning, not in cognitive and sensorimotor visual systems 
  Bruce Bridgeman
  Page 287-287
• What proper names, and their absence, do not demonstrate 
  Andrew Carstairs-McCarthy
  Page 288-289
• Hurfords partial vindication of classical empiricism 
  Fiona Cowie
  Page 289-290
• Object recognition is not predication 
  Jean-Louis Dessalles and Laleh Ghadakpour
  Page 290-291
• Representational limitations of the one-place predicate 
  Peter F. Dominey
  Page 291-292
• Cognitive structure, logic, and language 
  Grant Gillett
  Page 292-293
• Word-sentences and an interaction-based account of language evolution 
  Bipin Indurkhya
  Page 293-293
• Predicates as cantilevers for the bridge between perception and knowledge 
  Gregory V. Jones
  Page 294-294
• Do sensorimotor processes have reflexes in sentence syntax as well as sentence semantics? 
  Alistair Knott
  Page 294-295
• Perceiving and describing motion events 
  Shulan Lu and Donald R. Franceschetti
  Page 295-296
• Message and medium: Lowly and action-related origins 
  Peter F. MacNeilage and Barbara L. Davis
  Page 296-297
• Arguments in the syntactic straitjacket 
  Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini and Heidi Harley
  Page 297-298
• No problem for Aristotles subject and predicate 
  Guy Politzer
  Page 298-299
• Ventral versus dorsal pathway: The source of the semantic object/event and the syntactic noun/verb distinction? 
  Markus Werning
  Page 299-300
• The neural representation of spatial predicate-argument structures in sign language 
  Bencie Woll
  Page 300-301
• Ventral/dorsal, predicate/argument: The transformation from perception to meaning 
  James R. Hurford
  Page 301-311
• The comparative psychology of uncertainty monitoring and metacognition 
  J. David Smith, Wendy E. Shields and David A. Washburn
  Page 317-339
• Some sceptical thoughts about metacognition 
  Derek Browne
  Page 340-341
• On linking comparative metacognition and theory of mind 
  Josep Call
  Page 341-342
• If metacognition exists in other species, how does it develop? 
  Ruth Campos and Annette Karmiloff-Smith
  Page 342-342
• Monitoring without metacognition 
  Peter Carruthers
  Page 342-343
• Pigeon parallels to human metacognition 
  Edmund Fantino
  Page 343-344
• Varieties of uncertainty monitoring 
  John H. Flavell
  Page 344-344
• Dolphins on the witness stand? The comparative psychology of strategic memory regulation 
  Morris Goldsmith and Asher Koriat
  Page 345-346
• Metacognition as evidence for explicit representation in nonhumans 
  Robert Russell Hampton
  Page 346-347
• Parsimonious explanations and wider evolutionary consequences 
  James E. King
  Page 347-348
• Can we be too uncertain about uncertainty responses? 
  Lori Marino
  Page 348-349
• Animals show monitoring, but does monitoring imply awareness? 
  Giuliana Mazzoni
  Page 349-350
• Drawing the line on metacognition 
  Janet Metcalfe
  Page 350-351
• Relevance of unjustified strong assumptions when utilizing signal detection theory 
  Thomas O. Nelson
  Page 351-351
• Does metacognition necessarily involve metarepresentation? 
  Jolle Proust
  Page 352-352
• Animal metacognition? Its all in the methods 
  Sara J. Shettleworth and Jennifer E. Sutton
  Page 353-354
• Uncertainty monitoring may promote emergents 
  Duane M. Rumbaugh, Michael J. Beran and James L. Pate
  Page 353-353
• Metaknowledge may or may not facilitate knowledge and performance 
  Charles P. Shimp
  Page 354-355
• Implicit metacognition, explicit uncertainty, and the monitoring/control distinction in animal metacognition 
  Lisa K. Son, Bennett L. Schwartz and Nate Kornell
  Page 355-356
• Uncertain what uncertainty monitoring monitors 
  Victoria M. Wilkins, LeeAnn Cardaciotto and Steven M. Platek
  Page 356-357
• Evidence both for and against metacognition is insufficient 
  Thomas R. Zentall
  Page 357-358
• Inaugurating a new area of comparative cognition research 
  J. David Smith, Wendy E. Shields and David A. Washburn
  Page 358-369