Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Volume 27 : Issue 1

Table of Contents

• In Memoriam: Jeffrey Gray (19342004) 
  Helen Hodges, Stevan Harnad, Barbara L. Finlay and Paul Bloom
  Page 1-2
• Separate visual representations in the planning and control of action 
  Scott Glover
  Page 3-24
• At least some electrophysiological and behavioural data cannot be reconciled with the planningcontrol model 
  P. Paolo Battaglini, Paolo Bernardis and Nicola Bruno
  Page 24-25
• fMRI evidence for and behavioral evidence against the planningcontrol model 
  Jos J. Adam and Ron F. Keulen
  Page 24-24
• Can the motor system utilize a stored representation to control movement? 
  Gordon Binsted and Matthew Heath
  Page 25-27
• Defining visuomotor dissociations and an application to the oculomotor system 
  Bruce Bridgeman
  Page 27-28
• Using the same information for planning and control is compatible with the dynamic illusion effect 
  Anne-Marie Brouwer, Eli Brenner and Jeroen B. J. Smeets
  Page 28-29
• Planning and controlling action in a structured environment: Visual illusion without dorsal stream 
  Yann Coello and Yves Rossetti
  Page 29-31
• The planningcontrol model and spatio-motor deficits following brain damage 
  H. Branch Coslett and Laurel J. Buxbaum
  Page 31-32
• Scale errors by very young children: A dissociation between action planning and control 
  Judy S. DeLoache
  Page 32-33
• Visual context can influence on-line control 
  Digby Elliott and Daniel V. Meegan
  Page 33-34
• Is there a dynamic illusion effect in the motor system? 
  Volker H. Franz
  Page 34-35
• Do movement planning and control represent independent modules? 
  Valrie Gaveau and Michel Desmurget
  Page 35-36
• How are cognition and movement control related to each other? 
  Maurizio Gentilucci and Sergio Chieffi
  Page 36-37
• Plans for action 
  Melvyn A. Goodale and A. David Milner
  Page 37-40
• The organization of action representations in posterior parietal cortex 
  Scott H. Johnson-Frey
  Page 40-41
• Is there an independent planning system? Suggestions from a developmental perspective 
  Zsuzsa Kldy and Ilona Kovcs
  Page 41-42
• Action planning in humans and chimpanzees but not in monkeys 
  Nobuyuki Kawai
  Page 42-43
• Form follows function in visual information processing 
  Richard Latto
  Page 43-44
• Automaticity and inhibition in action planning 
  Matthew R. Longo and Bennett I. Bertenthal
  Page 44-45
• Evidence from optic ataxia does not support a distinction between planning and control mechanisms in human motor control 
  Roger Newport, Sally Pears and Stephen R. Jackson
  Page 45-46
• Planning and control of action as solutions to an independence of visual mechanisms 
  James G. Phillips, Thomas J. Triggs and James W. Meehan
  Page 46-47
• Two types of object representations in the brain, one nondescriptive process of reference fixing 
  Athanassios Raftopoulos
  Page 47-48
• Strong modularity and circular reasoning pervade the planningcontrol model 
  Vernica C. Ramenzoni and Michael A. Riley
  Page 48-49
• Is efficient control of visually guided movement directly mediated by current feedback? 
  Patrice Revol and Claude Prablanc
  Page 49-50
• Parallel visual pathways from the retina to the visual cortex how do they fit? 
  Luiz Carlos L. Silveira
  Page 50-51
• The control process is represented in both the inferior and superior parietal lobules 
  David E. Vaillancourt, Mary A. Mayka and Daniel M. Corcos
  Page 51-52
• Further evidence for, and some against, a planningcontrol dissociation 
  Paul van Donkelaar and Paul R. Dassonville
  Page 52-53
• Human vision focuses on information relevant to a task, to the detriment of information that is not relevant 
  Peter M. Vishton
  Page 53-54
• Planning, control, and the illusion of explanation 
  David A. Westwood
  Page 54-55
• Planning differences for chromaticity- and luminance-defined stimuli: A possible problem for Glovers planningcontrol model 
  Charles E. Wright and Charles Chubb
  Page 55-56
• Planning and control: Are they separable in the brain? Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem 
  Myrka Zago, Francesco Lacquaniti, Alexandra Battaglia-Mayer and Roberto Caminiti
  Page 56-57
• Planning and control in action 
  Scott Glover
  Page 57-69
• Constructing an understanding of mind: The development of childrens social understanding within social interaction 
  Jeremy I. M. Carpendale and Charlie Lewis
  Page 79-96
• Whats new about social construction? Distinct roles needed for language and communication 
  Janet Wilde Astington
  Page 96-97
• The role of social experience in advanced social understanding 
  Robin Banerjee
  Page 97-98
• Even an epistemic triangle has three sides 
  John Barresi and Chris Moore
  Page 98-99
• Articulating the role of experience in mental state understanding: A challenge for theory-theory and other theories 
  Karen Bartsch and David Estes
  Page 99-100
• Why believe in beliefs? 
  Mark H. Bickhard
  Page 100-101
• The contributions of the interdisciplinary study of language to an understanding of mind 
  Nancy Budwig
  Page 101-102
• Agency mediation and an understanding of the mind 
  Olga Chesnokova
  Page 102-102
• Children, chimpanzees, and social understanding: Inter- or intra-specific? 
  Timothy J. Eddy
  Page 103-104
• I aint got no body: Developmental psychology must be embodied and enactive, as well as social 
  A. P. Craig and L. Barrett
  Page 103-103
• More than a context for learning? The epistemic triangle and the dialogic mind 
  Charles Fernyhough
  Page 104-105
• The roots of social understanding in the attachment relationship: An elaboration on the constructionist theory 
  Peter Fonagy
  Page 105-106
• No (social) construction without (meta-)representation: Modular mechanisms as a basis for the capacity to acquire an understanding of mind 
  Tim P. German and Alan M. Leslie
  Page 106-107
• Individualism and cognitive development 
  Philip Gerrans
  Page 107-108
• The role of executive function in constructing an understanding of mind 
  Suzanne Hala
  Page 108-109
• Understanding self and other 
  R. Peter Hobson
  Page 109-110
• The sibling relationship as a context for the development of social understanding 
  Nina Howe
  Page 110-111
• Emotions and emotion cognition contribute to the construction and understanding of mind 
  Carroll E. Izard
  Page 111-112
• The space in between: The development of joint thinking and planning 
  Jennifer M. Jenkins and Keith Oatley
  Page 112-113
• Reconstructing childrens understanding of mind: Reflections from the study of atypical development 
  Susan R. Leekam
  Page 113-114
• Rich interactions and poor theories 
  Orlando M. Loureno
  Page 114-115
• Constructing agents: Rethinking the how and what in developmental theories of social understanding 
  Victoria McGeer
  Page 115-115
• Structure, genesis, and criteria 
  Carol A. Miller and Ulrich Mller
  Page 116-117
• Infants minds, mothers minds, and other minds: How individual differences in caregivers affect the co-construction of mind 
  Elizabeth Meins
  Page 116-116
• Being able to understand minds does not result from a conceptual shift 
  Peter Mitchell
  Page 117-118
• Challenging theory-theory accounts of social understanding: Where is the social constructivist advantage? 
  Derek E. Montgomery
  Page 118-119
• Toward a collaborative community of minds 
  Katherine Nelson
  Page 119-120
• Childrens understanding of mind: Constructivist but theory-like 
  Ted Ruffman
  Page 120-121
• Wittgensteinian developmental investigations 
  John Shotter
  Page 121-122
• Acts of judgment, not epistemic triangles 
  Leslie Smith
  Page 122-123
• Social understanding and the cognitive architecture of theory of mind 
  Michael Siegal
  Page 122-122
• A penny is your thoughts? Reflections on a Wittgensteinian proposal 
  Bryan W. Sokol and Christopher E. Lalonde
  Page 123-124
• The social matrix reloaded: An attachment perspective on Carpendale Lewis 
  Howard Steele
  Page 124-125
• The internalization of mental state discourse contributes to social understanding 
  Douglas K. Symons
  Page 125-126
• The mind in the mind of the beholder: Elucidating relational influences on early social understanding 
  Ross A. Thompson and H. Abigail Raikes
  Page 126-127
• In defense of enculturation 
  Penelope G. Vinden
  Page 127-128
• Interpretation based on richness of experience: Theory development from a social-constructivist perspective 
  Arlene S. Walker-Andrews and Judith A. Hudson
  Page 128-129
• What infants know about intentional action and how they might come to know it 
  Camille Wilson-Brune and Amanda L. Woodward
  Page 129-129
• Constructing an understanding of mind with peers 
  Stephanie Zerwas, Geetha Balaraman and Celia Brownell
  Page 130-130
• Constructing understanding, with feeling 
  Jeremy I. M. Carpendale and Charlie Lewis
  Page 130-141
• The Chinese room is a trick 
  Peter Kugel
  Page 153-154
• The sociobiology of sociopathy: An alternative hypothesis 
  Wim E. Crusio
  Page 154-155
• Multivariate modelling of testosterone-dominance associations 
  Helmuth Nyborg
  Page 155-159
• Testosterone, cortisol, dominance, and submission: Biologically prepared motivation, no psychological mechanisms involved 
  Jack van Honk, Dennis J. L. G. Schutter, Erno J. Hermans and Peter Putman
  Page 160-160
• Amodal or perceptual symbol systems: A false dichotomy? 
  W. Martin Davies
  Page 162-163
• Color, qualia, and psychophysical constraints on equivalence of color experience 
  Vincent A. Billock and Brian H. Tsou
  Page 164-165
• The what and how of color experience 
  Richard Krivin
  Page 165-166
• Newtons colour circle and Palmers normal colour space 
  Gbor A. Zempln
  Page 166-168