Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Volume 30 : Issue 5-6

Table of Contents

• Précis of The Rational Imagination: How People Create Alternatives to Reality 
  Ruth M. J. Byrne
  Page 439
• Imagination and reason 
  Joseph Agassi
  Page 453
• Counterfactuals in science and engineering 
  Sanjay Chandrasekharan and Nancy J. Nersessian
  Page 454
• What we imagine versus how we imagine, and a problem for explaining counterfactual thoughts with causal ones 
  Winston Chang and Patricia Herrmann
  Page 455
• Three steps to rational imagining? 
  Jennifer Church
  Page 456
• Beyond rationality: Counterfactual thinking and behavior regulation 
  Kai Epstude and Neal J. Roese
  Page 457
• Semifactual: Byrne's account of even-if 
  Simon J. Handley and Aidan Feeney
  Page 458
• The goals of counterfactual possibilities 
  Paolo Legrenzi
  Page 459
• Differential focus in causal and counterfactual thinking: Different possibilities or different functions? 
  David R. Mandel
  Page 460
• Counterfactuals need not be comparative: The case of As if 
  Keith D. Markman and Matthew N. McMullen
  Page 461
• Imagination as a source of rationality in development 
  Henry Markovits
  Page 462
• Thinking developmentally about counterfactual possibilities 
  Kevin J. Riggs and Sarah R. Beck
  Page 463
• When imagination is difficult: Metacognitive experiences at the fault lines of reality 
  Lawrence J. Sanna
  Page 464
• Imagination is only as rational as the purpose to which it is put 
  Andrew Shtulman
  Page 465
• On the relation between counterfactual and causal reasoning 
  Barbara A. Spellman and Dieynaba G. Ndiaye
  Page 466
• How rational is the imagination? 
  Robert J. Sternberg
  Page 467
• The development of the counterfactual imagination 
  Jennifer Van Reet, Ashley M. Pinkham and Angeline S. Lillard
  Page 468
• Emotional consequences of alternatives to reality: Feeling is for doing 
  Marcel Zeelenberg
  Page 469
• The rational imagination and other possibilities 
  Ruth M. J. Byrne
  Page 470
• Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience 
  Ned Block
  Page 481
• Access to phenomenality: A necessary condition of phenomenality? 
  Katalin Balog
  Page 499
• Psychology supports independence of phenomenal consciousness 
  Tyler Burge
  Page 500
• Do we see more than we can access? 
  Alex Byrne, David R. Hilbert and Susanna Siegel
  Page 501
• Experience and agency: Slipping the mesh 
  Andy Clark and Julian Kiverstein
  Page 502
• Why babies are more conscious than we are 
  Alison Gopnik
  Page 503
• A plug for generic phenomenology 
  Rick Grush
  Page 504
• The mesh as evidence model comparison and alternative interpretations of feedback 
  Oliver J. Hulme and Louise Whiteley
  Page 505
• Many ways to awareness: A developmental perspective on cognitive access 
  Carroll E. Izard, Paul C. Quinn and Steven B. Most
  Page 506
• What is cognitive accessibility accessibility to? 
  Pierre Jacob
  Page 508
• Phenomenology without conscious access is a form of consciousness without top-down attention 
  Christof Koch and Naotsugu Tsuchiya
  Page 509
• Partial awareness and the illusion of phenomenal consciousness 
  Sid Kouider, Vincent de Gardelle and Emmanuel Dupoux
  Page 510
• Sue Ned Block!: Making a better case for P-consciousness 
  Victor A. F. Lamme
  Page 511
• Can we equate iconic memory with visual awareness? 
  Rogier Landman and Ilja G. Sligte
  Page 512
• Broken telephone in the brain: The need for metacognitive measures 
  Hakwan Lau and Navindra Persaud
  Page 513
• Two kinds of access 
  Joseph Levine
  Page 514
• Phenomenality without access? 
  William G. Lycan
  Page 515
• The measurement problem in consciousness research 
  Rafael Malach
  Page 516
• Dodging the explanatory gap or bridging it 
  Drew McDermott
  Page 518
• Phenomenal consciousness lite: No thanks! 
  J. Kevin O'Regan and Erik Myin
  Page 520
• Reuniting (scene) phenomenology with (scene) access 
  David Papineau
  Page 521
• Phenomenological overflow and cognitive access 
  David M. Rosenthal
  Page 522
• Conscious access overflows overt report 
  Claire Sergent and Geraint Rees
  Page 523
• Global workspace theory emerges unscathed 
  Murray Shanahan and Bernard Baars
  Page 524
• Access for what? Reflective consciousness 
  Michael Snodgrass and Scott A. Lepisto
  Page 525
• Expecting phenomenology 
  Maja Spener
  Page 526
• Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive accessibility 
  Michael Tye
  Page 527
• What if phenomenal consciousness admits of degrees? 
  Robert Van Gulick
  Page 528
• The challenge of disentangling reportability and phenomenal consciousness in post-comatose states 
  Audrey Vanhaudenhuyse, Marie-Aurélie Bruno, Serge Brédart, Alain Plenevaux and Steven Laureys
  Page 529
• Overflow, access, and attention 
  Ned Block
  Page 530