Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Volume 31 : Issue 2

Table of Contents

• Darwin's mistake: Explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds 
  Derek C. Penn, Keith J. Holyoak and Daniel J. Povinelli
  Page 109
• Out of their heads: Turning relational reinterpretation inside out 
  Louise Barrett
  Page 130
• The reinterpretation hypothesis: Explanation or redescription? 
  José Luis Bermúdez
  Page 131
• Darwin's last word: How words changed cognition 
  Derek Bickerton
  Page 132
• The sun always rises: Scientists also need semantics 
  Gordon M. Burghardt
  Page 133
• Imaginative scrub-jays, causal rooks, and a liberal application of Occam's aftershave 
  Nathan J. Emery and Nicola S. Clayton
  Page 134
• Comparative intelligence and intelligent comparisons 
  R. Allen Gardner
  Page 135
• Relational language supports relational cognition in humans and apes 
  Dedre Gentner and Stella Christie
  Page 136
• The missing link: Dynamic, modifiable representations in working memory 
  Graeme S. Halford, Steven Phillips and William H. Wilson
  Page 137
• Ontogeny, phylogeny, and the relational reinterpretation hypothesis 
  Elizabeth V. Hallinan and Valerie A. Kuhlmeier
  Page 138
• Bottlenose dolphins understand relationships between concepts 
  Louis M. Herman, Robert K. Uyeyama and Adam A. Pack
  Page 139
• Taking symbols for granted? Is the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds the product of external symbol systems? 
  Gary Lupyan
  Page 140
• An amicus for the defense: Relational reasoning magnifies the behavioral differences between humans and nonhumans 
  Arthur B. Markman and C. Hunt Stilwell
  Page 142
• Difficulties with humaniqueness 
  Irene M. Pepperberg
  Page 143
• Quotidian cognition and the human-nonhuman divide: Just more or less of a good thing? 
  Drew Rendall, John R. Vokey and Hugh Notman
  Page 144
• Language as a consequence and an enabler of the exercise of higher-order relational capabilities: Evidence from toddlers 
  Marilyn Shatz
  Page 145
• If we could talk to the animals 
  Michael Siegal and Rosemary Varley
  Page 146
• Explaining human cognitive autapomorphies 
  Thomas Suddendorf
  Page 147
• Languages of thought need to be distinguished from learning mechanisms, and nothing yet rules out multiple distinctively human learning systems 
  Michael Tetzlaff and Peter Carruthers
  Page 148
• Analogical apes and paleological monkeys revisited 
  Roger K. R. Thompson and Timothy M. Flemming
  Page 149
• Monkey see, monkey do: Learning relations through concrete examples 
  Marc T. Tomlinson and Bradley C. Love
  Page 150
• On possible discontinuities between human and nonhuman minds 
  Edward A. Wasserman
  Page 151
• Minding the gap: Why there is still no theory in comparative psychology 
  Clive D. L. Wynne and Johan J. Bolhuis
  Page 152
• Darwin's triumph: Explaining the uniqueness of the human mind without a deus ex machina 
  Derek C. Penn, Keith J. Holyoak and Daniel J. Povinelli
  Page 153
• Visual prediction: Psychophysics and neurophysiology of compensation for time delays 
  Romi Nijhawan
  Page 179
• Shifting attention to the flash-lag effect 
  Marcus Vinícius C. Baldo and Stanley A. Klein
  Page 198
• Anticipation requires adaptation 
  Christian Balkenius and Peter Gärdenfors
  Page 199
• Visuomotor delay in interceptive actions 
  Nicolas Benguigui, Robin Baurès and Cyrille Le Runigo
  Page 200
• Flash-lag: Prediction or emergent property of directional selectivity mechanisms? 
  Julia Berzhanskaya
  Page 201
• The trade-off between speed and complexity 
  Mark Andrew Changizi
  Page 203
• Asynchronous neural integration: Compensation or computational tolerance and skill acquisition? 
  James E. Cutting
  Page 204
• Prediction and postdiction: Two frameworks with the goal of delay compensation 
  David M. Eagleman
  Page 205
• Mental and sensorimotor extrapolation fare better than motion extrapolation in the offset condition 
  Dirk Kerzel and Jochen Müsseler
  Page 206
• What's in a name change? Visual prediction makes extrapolation real and functional 
  Beena Khurana
  Page 207
• Perception of direction is not compensated for neural latency 
  Bart Krekelberg
  Page 208
• Unconscious inference and conscious representation: Why primary visual cortex (V1) is directly involved in visual awareness 
  Zhicheng Lin
  Page 209
• Neuronal adaptation: Delay compensation at the level of single neurons? 
  J. Patrick Mayo and Marc A. Sommer
  Page 210
• Phase-alignment of delayed sensory signals by adaptive filters 
  Dennis J. McFarland
  Page 212
• Neurophysiology of compensation for time delays: Visual prediction is off track 
  Gopathy Purushothaman, Harold E. Bedell, Haluk Ömen and Saumil S. Patel
  Page 214
• The mechanisms responsible for the flash-lag effect cannot provide the motor prediction that we need in daily life 
  Jeroen B. J. Smeets and Eli Brenner
  Page 215
• Anticipating synchronization as an alternative to the internal model 
  Nigel Stepp and Michael T. Turvey
  Page 216
• Empirically testable models are needed for understanding visual prediction 
  Giuseppe Trautteur, Edoardo Datteri and Matteo Santoro
  Page 217
• Motion as a reference for positions 
  Wim van de Grind
  Page 218
• Perception-action as reciprocal, continuous, and prospective 
  Jeffrey B. Wagman
  Page 219
• Visuomotor extrapolation 
  David Whitney
  Page 220
• Compensation for time delays is better achieved in time than in space 
  Myrka Zago and Francesco Lacquaniti
  Page 221
• Predictive perceptions, predictive actions, and beyond 
  Romi Nijhawan
  Page 222