Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Volume 28 : Issue 5

Table of Contents

• Prcis of Breakdown of Will 
  George Ainslie
  Page 635
• Models of preference reversals and personal rules: Do they require maximizing a utility function with a specific structure? 
  Horacio Arl-Costa
  Page 650
• Three other motivational factors 
  Kent Bach
  Page 651
• Hyperbolas and hyperbole: The free will problem remains 
  Bruce Bridgeman
  Page 652
• Regret and the control of temporary preferences 
  Terry Connolly and Jochen Reb
  Page 653
• The will: Interpersonal bargaining versus intrapersonal prediction 
  Luca Ferrero
  Page 654
• Hyperbola-like discounting, impulsivity, and the analysis of will 
  Leonard Green and Joel Myerson
  Page 655
• Comparing apples to oranges: Who does the framing? 
  Richard Griffin and Daniel Dennett
  Page 656
• Shaping your past selves 
  Jeanne Peijnenburg
  Page 657
• Problems with internalization 
  Howard Rachlin
  Page 658
• Behavioral (pico)economics and the brain sciences 
  Don Ross and David Spurrett
  Page 659
• Freud meets Skinner: Hyperbolic curves, elliptical theories, and Ainslie Interests 
  Federico Sanabria and Peter R. Killeen
  Page 660
• On the coexistence of cognitivism and intertemporal bargaining 
  Keith E. Stanovich
  Page 661
• To do or not to do? Modeling the control of behavior 
  John D. Swain and James E. Swain
  Page 662
• Reference point-dependent tradeoffs in intertemporal decision making 
  X. T. Wang and Jeffrey S. Simons
  Page 663
• A bazaar of opinions mostly fit within picoeconomics 
  George Ainslie
  Page 664
• Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition 
  Michael Tomasello, Malinda Carpenter, Josep Call, Tanya Behne and Henrike Moll
  Page 675
• Language first, then shared intentionality, then a beneficent spiral 
  Derek Bickerton
  Page 691
• Joint cooperative hunting among wild chimpanzees: Taking natural observations seriously 
  Christophe Boesch
  Page 692
• Early development of shared intentionality with peers 
  Celia A. Brownell, Sara Nichols and Margarita Svetlova
  Page 693
• Homo sapiens, a localized species 
  Jerome Bruner
  Page 694
• Why do individuals with autism lack the motivation or capacity to share intentions? 
  Tony Charman
  Page 695
• Toward a construction-based account of shared intentions in social cognition 
  Peter F. Dominey
  Page 696
• Symbolic behavior and perspective-taking are forms of derived relational responding and can be learned 
  Simon Dymond and Louise McHugh
  Page 697
• What is internalised? Dialogic cognitive representations and the mediated mind 
  Charles Fernyhough
  Page 698
• Animal cognition meets evo-devo 
  R. Allen Gardner
  Page 699
• What are the consequences of understanding the complex goal-directed actions of others? 
  Mary Gauvain
  Page 700
• A few reasons why we dont share Tomasello et al.s intuitions about sharing 
  Gyrgy Gergely and Gergely Csibra
  Page 701
• Is shared intentionality widespread among and unique to humans? 
  Giyoo Hatano and Keiko Takahashi
  Page 703
• Identifying the motivations of chimpanzees: Culture and collaboration 
  Victoria Horner, Kristin E. Bonnie and Frans B. M. de Waal
  Page 704
• Dolphin play: Evidence for cooperation and culture? 
  Stan A. Kuczaj and Lauren E. Highfill
  Page 705
• Steps toward categorizing motivation: Abilities, limitations, and conditional constraints 
  Valerie A. Kuhlmeier and Susan A. J. Birch
  Page 706
• Shared intentions without a self 
  Michael Lewis
  Page 707
• Motivation is not enough 
  Derek E. Lyons, Webb Phillips and Laurie R. Santos
  Page 708
• Motivation, self-regulation, and the neurodevelopment of intention sharing 
  Peter Mundy
  Page 709
• Do infants understand that external goals are internally represented? 
  Josef Perner and Martin Doherty
  Page 710
• From action to interaction: Apes, infants, and the last Rubicon 
  Diane Poulin-Dubois
  Page 711
• Reinterpreting behavior: A human specialization? 
  Daniel J. Povinelli and Jochen Barth
  Page 712
• Illusions of intentionality, shared and unshared 
  Robert R. Provine
  Page 713
• Humans evolved to become Homo negotiatus . . . the rest followed 
  Philippe Rochat
  Page 714
• Distinctive human social motivations in a game-theoretic framework 
  Don Ross
  Page 715
• Why not chimpanzees, lions, and hyenas too? 
  Richard Schuster
  Page 716
• Baby steps on the path to understanding intentions 
  Amrisha Vaish and Amanda Woodward
  Page 717
• Lack of motivation to share intentions: Primary deficit in autism? 
  Eline Verbeke, Wilfried Peeters, Inneke Kerkhof, Patricia Bijttebier, Jean Steyaert and Johan Wagemans
  Page 718
• Einsteins baby could infer intentionality 
  John S. Watson
  Page 719
• Triadic bodily mimesis is the difference 
  Jordan Zlatev, Tomas Persson and Peter Grdenfors
  Page 720
• In Search of the Uniquely Human 
  Michael Tomasello, Malinda Carpenter, Josep Call, Tanya Behne and Henrike Moll
  Page 721