Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Volume 24 : Issue 1

Table of Contents

• The dynamics of embodiment: A field theory of infant perseverative reaching 
  Esther Thelen, Gregor Schner, Christian Scheier and Linda B. Smith
  Page 1
• Accounting for infant perseveration beyond the manual search task 
  Sarah E. Berger
  Page 34
• Plus maze experiments and the boundary conditions of the dynamic field model 
  Melissa Burns and Michael Domjan
  Page 35
• Embodiment is all in the head 
  Paul Cisek
  Page 36
• Looking closely at infants performance and experimental procedures in the A-not-B task 
  Adele Diamond
  Page 38
• Movement planning and movement execution: What is in between? 
  N. Dounskaia and G. E. Stelmach
  Page 41
• The behavior-cognition link is well done; the cognition-brain link needs more work 
  Walter J. Freeman
  Page 42
• An affordance field for guiding movement and cognition 
  Arthur M. Glenberg, Monica R. Cowart and Michael P. Kaschak
  Page 43
• Why the Piagetian A-not-B phenomenon is no error: A comparative perspective 
  Jack P. Hailman
  Page 44
• Bridging the gap: Dynamics as a unified view of cognition 
  Derek Harter, Arthur C. Graesser and Stan Franklin
  Page 45
• Mirror writing: Adults making A-non-B errors? 
  Mark L. Latash
  Page 46
• Self-organizing brains dont develop gradually 
  Marc D. Lewis
  Page 47
• On the need for conscious control and conceptual understanding 
  Stuart Marcovitch and Philip David Zelazo
  Page 48
• Can there be embodiment without a body/brain? 
  Denis Mareschal
  Page 49
• Are dynamical systems the answer? 
  Arthur B. Markman
  Page 50
• Navigating the complex dynamics of memory and desire: Mathematics accommodates continuous and conditional dynamics 
  Gin McCollum
  Page 51
• Is a field theory of perseverative reaching compatible with a Piagetian view? 
  Lorraine McCune
  Page 53
• Infants reach to location A without practice or training 
  Laraine McDonough
  Page 54
• Objectivity, intentionality, and levels of explanation 
  Ulrich Mller and Jeremy I. M. Carpendale
  Page 55
• An embodied theory in search of a body: Challenges for a dynamic systems model of infant perseveration 
  Yoke Munakata, Sarah Devi Sahni and Benjamin E. Yerys
  Page 56
• A spatial coding analysis of the A-not-B error: What IS Location at A? 
  Nora S. Newcombe
  Page 57
• The role of action representations in the dynamics of embodied cognition 
  Natika Newton
  Page 58
• Cooperative field theory is critical for embodiment 
  Patrick D. Roberts
  Page 59
• Does cognitive development move beyond sensorimotor intelligence? 
  Catherine Sophian
  Page 61
• The essence of cognitive development 
  John P. Spencer
  Page 62
• Plus a change . . . : Jost, Piaget, and the dynamics of embodiment 
  J. E. R. Staddon, A. Machado and O. Loureno
  Page 63
• Dynamic comparison of the development of combinatory manipulations between chimpanzee and human infants 
  Hideko Takeshita
  Page 65
• Next step, synergetics? 
  Wolfgang Tschacher and Ulrich M. Junghan
  Page 66
• The social dynamics of embodied cognition 
  S. Stavros Valenti and Thomas A. Stoffregen
  Page 67
• Do adults make A-not-B errors in pointing? 
  Philippe Vindras and Edouard Gentaz
  Page 68
• So whats a modeler to do? 
  Esther Thelen, Gregor Schner, Christian Scheier and Linda B. Smith
  Page 70
• The magical number 4 in short-term memory: A reconsideration of mental storage capacity 
  Nelson Cowan
  Page 87
• The dangers of taking capacity limits too literally 
  S. E. Avons, Geoff Ward and Riccardo Russo
  Page 114
• A biocognitive approach to the conscious core of immediate memory 
  Bernard J. Baars
  Page 115
• The magical number 4 7: Span theory on capacity limitations 
  Bruce L. Bachelder
  Page 116
• The magic number and the episodic buffer 
  Alan Baddeley
  Page 117
• The size and nature of a chunk 
  C. Philip Beaman
  Page 118
• There is no four-object limit on attention 
  Greg Davis
  Page 119
• The search for fixed generalizable limits of pure STM capacity: Problems with theoretical proposals based on independent chunks 
  K. Anders Ericsson and Elizabeth P. Kirk
  Page 120
• Working memory capacity and the hemispheric organization of the brain 
  Gabriele Gratton, Monica Fabiani and Paul M. Corballis
  Page 121
• A temporal account of the limited processing capacity 
  Simon Grondin
  Page 122
• Processing capacity limits are not explained by storage limits 
  Graeme S. Halford, Steven Phillips and William H. Wilson
  Page 123
• Pure short-term memory capacity has implications for understanding individual differences in math skills 
  Steven A. Hecht and Todd K. Shackelford
  Page 124
• The magic number four: Can it explain Sternbergs serial memory scan data? 
  Jerwen Jou
  Page 126
• Magical number 5 in a chimpanzee 
  Nobuyuki Kawai and Tetsuro Matsuzawa
  Page 127
• What forms the chunks in a subjects performance? Lessons from the CHREST computational model of learning 
  Peter C.R. Lane, Fernand Gobet and Peter C-H. Cheng
  Page 128
• The focus of attention across space and across time 
  Brian McElree and Barbara Anne Dosher
  Page 129
• Capacity limits in continuous old-new recognition and in short-term implicit memory 
  Elinor McKone
  Page 130
• Magical attention 
  Peter M. Milner
  Page 131
• Nothing left in store . . . but how do we measure attentional capacity? 
  Sergio Morra
  Page 132
• Partial matching theory and the memory span 
  David J. Murray
  Page 133
• Long-term memory span 
  James S. Nairne and Ian Neath
  Page 134
• Where the magic breaks down: Boundaries and the focus-of-attention in schizophrenia 
  Robert D. Oades and Boutheina Jemel
  Page 135
• If the magical number is 4, how does one account for operations within working memory? 
  Juan Pascual-Leone
  Page 136
• Linguistic structure and short term memory 
  Emmanuel M. Pothos and Patrick Juola
  Page 138
• A neurophysioiogical account of working memory limits: Between-item segregation and within-chunk integration 
  Antonino Raffone, Gezinus Wolters and Jacob M. Murre
  Page 139
• Four-sight in hindsight: The existence of magical numbers in vision 
  Ronald A. Rensink
  Page 141
• Which brain mechanism cannot count beyond four? 
  Pieter R. Roelfsema and Victor A. F. Lamme
  Page 142
• Functional neuroimaging of short-term memory: The neural mechanisms of mental storage 
  Bart Rypma and John D.E. Gabrieli
  Page 143
• Characterizing chunks in visual short-term memory: Not more than one feature per dimension? 
  Werner X. Schneider, Heiner Deubel and Maria-Barbara Wesenick
  Page 144
• The magical number 4 in vision 
  Brian J. Scholl and Yaoda Xu
  Page 145
• How unitary is the capacity-limited attentional focus? 
  Torsten Schubert and Peter A. Frensch
  Page 146
• Dispelling the magic: Towards memory without capacity 
  Niels A. Taatgen
  Page 147
• How to interface cognitive psychology with cognitive neuroscience? 
  Hannu Tiitinen
  Page 148
• Studies of STM properties in animals may help us better understand the nature of our own storage limitations: The case of birdsong acquisition 
  Dietmar Todt
  Page 149
• Memory limits: Give us an answer! 
  John N. Towse
  Page 150
• Neural mechanism for the magical number 4: Competitive interactions and nonlinear oscillation 
  Marius Usher, Jonathan D. Cohen, Henk Haarmann and David Horn
  Page 151
• Over the top: Are there exceptions to the basic capacity limit? 
  John Wilding
  Page 152
• Attention is not unitary 
  Geoffrey F. Woodman, Edward K. Vogel and Steven J. Luck
  Page 153
• Metatheory of storage capacity limits 
  Nelson Cowan
  Page 154
• Facing the hard question 
  Wodzisaw Duch
  Page 187
• The contents of consciousness: From C to shining C 
  Michael H. Joseph and Samuel R. H. Joseph
  Page 188
• Must all action halt during sensorimotor mismatch? 
  Daniel M. Merfeld
  Page 189
• Motivating consciousness 
  Ian Vine
  Page 190
• No easy answers to hard or easy questions 
  Jeffrey Gray
  Page 191