Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Volume 26 : Issue 4

Table of Contents

• Gestalt isomorphism and the primacy of subjective conscious experience: A Gestalt Bubble model 
  Steven Lehar
  Page 375
• Phenomenology is art, not psychological or neural science 
  David A. Booth
  Page 408
• Double, double, toil and trouble fire burn, and theory bubble! 
  Birgitta Dresp
  Page 409
• Just bubbles? 
  Wodzisaw Duch
  Page 410
• Empirical constraints for perceptual modeling 
  Charles R. Fox
  Page 411
• Linking visual cortex to visual perception: An alternative to the Gestalt Bubble 
  Stephen Grossberg
  Page 412
• Steven Lehars Gestalt Bubble model of visual experience: The embodied percipient, emergent holism, and the ultimate question of consciousness 
  Keith Gunderson
  Page 413
• Backdrop, flat, and prop: The stage for active perceptual inquiry 
  Julian Hochberg
  Page 414
• Does perception replicate the external world? 
  Donald D. Hoffman
  Page 415
• Psychological relativity 
  Donald Laming
  Page 416
• Double trouble for Gestalt Bubbles 
  Dan Lloyd
  Page 417
• Isomorphism and representationalism 
  Riccardo Luccio
  Page 418
• The unified electrical field 
  William A. MacKay
  Page 419
• The soap bubble: Phenomenal state or perceptual system dynamics? 
  Slobodan Markovi
  Page 420
• Bursting the bubble: Do we need true Gestalt isomorphism? 
  Niall P. McLoughlin
  Page 421
• Relations between three-dimensional, volumetric experiences, and neural processes: Limitations of materialism 
  Axel Randrup
  Page 422
• Gestalt Bubble and the genesis of space 
  Victor Rosenthal and Yves-Marie Visetti
  Page 424
• Neurological models of size scaling 
  Helen E. Ross
  Page 425
• If vision is veridical hallucination, what keeps it veridical? 
  Peter Ulric Tse
  Page 426
• Is the world in the brain, or the brain in the world? 
  Max Velmans
  Page 427
• Percepts are selected from nonconceptual sensory fields 
  Edmond Wright
  Page 429
• Alternative paradigmatic hypotheses cannot be fairly evaluated from within ones own paradigmatic assumptions 
  Steven Lehar
  Page 430
• The E-Z Reader model of eye-movement control in reading: Comparisons to other models 
  Erik D. Reichle, Keith Rayner and Alexander Pollatsek
  Page 445
• E-Z Readers assumptions about lexical processing: Not so easy to define the two stages of word identification? 
  Sally Andrews
  Page 477
• How can selection-for-perception be decoupled from selection-for-action? 
  Ccile Beauvillain and Pierre Pouget
  Page 478
• Reading the scene: Application of E-Z Reader to object and scene perception 
  Peter De Graef and Filip Germeys
  Page 479
• Are there two populations of refixations in the reading of long words? 
  Karine Dor-Mazars, Dorine Vergilino-Perez and Thrse Collins
  Page 480
• The game of word skipping: Who are the competitors? 
  Ralf Engbert and Reinhold Kliegl
  Page 481
• Throwing the baby out with the bathwater: Problems in modeling aggregated eye-movement data 
  Gary Feng
  Page 482
• Serial programming for saccades: Does it all add up? 
  John M. Findlay and Sarah J. White
  Page 483
• Frontal lobe functions in reading: Evidence from dyslexic children performing nonreading saccade tasks 
  Burkhart Fischer
  Page 484
• Dimensionality and explanatory power of reading models 
  Douglas Hanes and Gin McCollum
  Page 486
• Visual word recognition and oculomotor control in reading 
  Lynn Huestegge, Jonathan Grainger and Ralph Radach
  Page 487
• Future challenges to E-Z Reader: Effects of OVP and morphology on processing long and short compounds 
  Jukka Hyn and Raymond Bertram
  Page 488
• Selection for fixation and selection for orthographic processing need not coincide 
  Albrecht W. Inhoff and Kelly Shindler
  Page 489
• On keeping word order straight 
  Alan Kennedy
  Page 490
• How tight is the link between lexical processing and saccade programs? 
  Reinhold Kliegl and Ralf Engbert
  Page 491
• Psycholinguistic processes affect fixation durations and orthographic information affects fixation locations: Can E-Z Reader cope? 
  Simon P. Liversedge and Sarah J. White
  Page 492
• Basic assumptions concerning eye-movement control during reading 
  George W. McConkie and Shun-Nan Yang
  Page 493
• The eye-movement engine 
  Wayne S. Murray
  Page 494
• On the perceptual and neural correlates of reading models 
  Naoyuki Osaka
  Page 495
• Linguistically guided refixations 
  Jeremy Pacht
  Page 496
• Regressions and eye movements: Where and when 
  Manuel Perea and Manuel Carreiras
  Page 497
• E-Z Reader 7 provides a platform for explaining how low- and high-level linguistic processes influence eye movements 
  Gary E. Raney
  Page 498
• Methodologies for comparing complex computational models of eye-movement control in reading: Just fitting the data is not enough 
  Ronan Reilly and Ralph Radach
  Page 499
• Eye-movement control in reading: Models and predictions 
  Eyal M. Reingold
  Page 500
• Neural plausibility and validation may not be so E-Z 
  Sara C. Sereno, Patrick J. ODonnell and Anne B. Sereno
  Page 502
• The effects of frequency and predictability on eye fixations in reading: An evaluation of the E-Z Reader model 
  Laurent Sparrow, Sbastien Miellet and Yann Coello
  Page 503
• Where to look next? The missing landing position effect 
  Geoffrey Underwood
  Page 505
• The basic assumptions of E-Z Reader are not well-founded 
  Franoise Vitu
  Page 506
• Eye movements in reading: Models and data 
  Keith Rayner, Alexander Pollatsek and Erik D. Reichle
  Page 507
• Freuds dual process theory and the place of the a-rational 
  Linda A. W. Brakel and Howard Shevrin
  Page 527
• The problems that generate the rationality debate are too easy, given what our economy now demands 
  Selmer Bringsjord and Yingrui Yang
  Page 528
• Individual differences transcend the rationality debate 
  Elizabeth J. Newton and Maxwell J. Roberts
  Page 530
• The rationality debate as a progressive research program 
  Keith E. Stanovich and Richard F. West
  Page 531