Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Volume 32 : Issue 2

Table of Contents

• How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition 
  Peter Carruthers
  Page 121
• What puts the meta in metacognition? 
  Michael L. Anderson and Don Perlis
  Page 138
• Is feeling pain just mindreading? Our mind-brain constructs realistic knowledge of ourselves 
  Bernard J. Baars
  Page 139
• How weak mindreaders inherited the earth 
  Cameron Buckner, Adam Shriver, Stephen Crowley and Colin Allen
  Page 140
• Cognitive science at fifty 
  A. Charles Catania
  Page 141
• Metacognition is prior 
  Justin J. Couchman, Mariana V. C. Coutinho, Michael J. Beran and J. David Smith
  Page 142
• What can we say about the inner experience of the young child? 
  Charles Fernyhough
  Page 143
• Confabulation, confidence, and introspection 
  Brian Fiala and Shaun Nichols
  Page 144
• How we know our conscious minds: Introspective access to conscious thoughts 
  Keith Frankish
  Page 145
• Non-interpretative metacognition for true beliefs 
  Ori Friedman and Adam R. Petrashek
  Page 146
• There must be more to development of mindreading and metacognition than passing false belief tasks 
  Mikolaj Hernik, Pasco Fearon and Peter Fonagy
  Page 147
• Banishing I and we from accounts of metacognition 
  Bryce Huebner and Daniel C. Dennett
  Page 148
• Unsymbolized thinking, sensory awareness, and mindreading 
  Russell T. Hurlburt
  Page 149
• What monkeys can tell us about metacognition and mindreading 
  Nate Kornell, Bennett L. Schwartz and Lisa K. Son
  Page 150
• Metacognition without introspection 
  Peter Langland-Hassan
  Page 151
• Carruthers' marvelous magical mindreading machine 
  Charlie Lewis and Jeremy I. M. Carpendale
  Page 152
• Feigning introspective blindness for thought 
  Robert W. Lurz
  Page 153
• Getting to know yourself and others 
  Candice M. Mills and Judith H. Danovitch
  Page 154
• Varieties of self-explanation 
  Dominic Murphy
  Page 155
• Global broadcasting and self-interpretation 
  David Pereplyotchik
  Page 156
• Introspection and interpretation: Dichotomy or continuum? 
  Richard E. Petty and Pablo Bri\xF1ol
  Page 157
• Overlooking metacognitive experience 
  Jo\xEBlle Proust
  Page 158
• Guilt by dissociation: Why mindreading may not be prior to metacognition after all 
  Philip Robbins
  Page 159
• Social-affective origins of mindreading and metacognition 
  Philippe Rochat
  Page 160
• Metacognition, mindreading, and insight in schizophrenia 
  Ben Wiffen and Anthony David
  Page 161
• Metacognition may be more impaired than mindreading in autism 
  David M. Williams, Sophie E. Lind and Francesca Happ\xE9
  Page 162
• Making a case for introspection 
  Alexandra Zinck, Sanne Lodahl and Chris D. Frith
  Page 163
• Mindreading underlies metacognition 
  Peter Carruthers
  Page 164
• The propositional nature of human associative learning 
  Chris J. Mitchell, Jan De Houwer and Peter F. Lovibond
  Page 183
• Associative learning requires associations, not propositions 
  Frank Baeyens, Debora Vansteenwegen and Dirk Hermans
  Page 198
• Propositional learning is a useful research heuristic but it is not a theoretical algorithm 
  A. G. Baker, Irina Baetu and Robin A. Murphy
  Page 199
• The truth and value of theories of associative learning 
  Tom Beckers and Bram Vervliet
  Page 200
• What's reason got to do with it? Affect as the foundation of learning 
  Eliza Bliss-Moreau and Lisa Feldman Barrett
  Page 201
• Learning without thinking 
  R. A. Boakes
  Page 202
• Rats and infants as propositional reasoners: A plausible possibility? 
  Leyre Castro and Edward A. Wasserman
  Page 203
• Rational models of conditioning 
  Nick Chater
  Page 204
• Is propositional learning necessary for human autonomic classical conditioning? 
  Michael E. Dawson and Anne M. Schell
  Page 205
• Straw-men and selective citation are needed to argue that associative-link formation makes no contribution to human learning 
  Dominic M. Dwyer, Michael E. Le Pelley, David N. George, Mark Haselgrove and Robert C. Honey
  Page 206
• Operating principles versus operating conditions in the distinction between associative and propositional processes 
  Bertram Gawronski and Galen V. Bodenhausen
  Page 207
• Rational constructivism: A new way to bridge rationalism and empiricism 
  Alison Gopnik
  Page 208
• Cognition, consciousness, and the cognitive revolution 
  John D. Greenwood
  Page 209
• Learning in simple systems 
  Geoffrey Hall
  Page 210
• A causal framework for integrating learning and reasoning 
  David A. Lagnado
  Page 211
• Trace conditioning, awareness, and the propositional nature of associative learning 
  Nanxin Li
  Page 212
• Saliences, propositions, and amalgams: Emergent learning in nonhumans 
  Heidi Lyn and Duane M. Rumbaugh
  Page 213
• Propositional encodings are a subset of organization theory 
  George Mandler
  Page 214
• The Proust effect and the evolution of a dual learning system 
  Helena Matute and Miguel A. Vadillo
  Page 215
• Both rules and associations are required to predict human behaviour 
  I. P. L. McLaren
  Page 216
• Associative learning without reason or belief 
  James D. Miles, Robert W. Proctor and E. J. Capaldi
  Page 217
• Undermining the foundations: Questioning the basic notions of associationism and mental representation 
  Ezequiel Morsella, Travis A. Riddle and John A. Bargh
  Page 218
• The new enlightenment hypothesis: All learners are rational 
  Rita Nolan
  Page 219
• Is cultivating biological blindness a viable route to understanding behavioral phenomena? 
  Andreas Olsson and Ame \xD6hman
  Page 220
• There is more to thinking than propositions 
  Derek C. Penn, Patricia W. Cheng, Keith J. Holyoak, John E. Hummel and Daniel J. Povinelli
  Page 221
• The computational nature of associative learning 
  N. A. Schmajuk and G. M. Kutlu
  Page 223
• Of mice and men: Revisiting the relation of nonhuman and human learning 
  Holger Schultheis and Harald Lachnit
  Page 224
• The associative nature of human associative learning 
  David R. Shanks
  Page 225
• How do we get from propositions to behavior? 
  Daniel A. Sternberg and James L. McClelland
  Page 226
• Automatic (spontaneous) propositional and associative learning of first impressions 
  James S. Uleman
  Page 227
• A one-system theory that is not propositional 
  James E. Witnauer, Gonzalo P. Urcelay and Ralph R. Miller
  Page 228
• Link-based learning theory creates more problems than it solves 
  Chris J. Mitchell, Jan De Houwer and Peter F. Lovibond
  Page 230
• No reliable gender differences in attachment across the lifespan 
  Marian J. Bakermans-Kranenburg and Marinus H. van IJzendoorn
  Page 247
• BBS volume 32 issue 2 Cover and Back matter 
  
  Page b1
• BBS volume 32 issue 2 Cover and Front matter 
  
  Page f1