Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Volume 33 : Issue 2-3

Table of Contents

• The weirdest people in the world? 
  Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine and Ara Norenzayan
  Page 61
• Why a theory of human nature cannot be based on the distinction between universality and variability: Lessons from anthropology 
  Rita Astuti and Maurice Bloch
  Page 83
• Weird people, yes, but also weird experiments 
  Nicolas Baumard and Dan Sperber
  Page 84
• Weirdness is in the eye of the beholder 
  Will M. Bennis and Douglas L. Medin
  Page 85
• Away from ethnocentrism and anthropocentrism: Towards a scientific understanding of what makes us human 
  Christophe Boesch
  Page 86
• The WEIRD are even weirder than you think: Diversifying contexts is as important as diversifying samples 
  Stephen J. Ceci, Dan M. Kahan and Donald Braman
  Page 87
• The weirdest brains in the world 
  Joan Y. Chiao and Bobby K. Cheon
  Page 88
• Diversity in representations; uniformity in learning 
  David Danks and David Rose
  Page 90
• Getting beyond the convenience sample in research on early cognitive development 
  Anne Fernald
  Page 91
• (Dis)advantages of student subjects: What is your research question? 
  Simon G\xE4chter
  Page 92
• It's not WEIRD, it's WRONG: When Researchers Overlook uNderlying Genotypes, they will not detect universal processes 
  Lowell Gaertner, Constantine Sedikides, Huajian Cai and Jonathon D. Brown
  Page 93
• Wired but not WEIRD: The promise of the Internet in reaching more diverse samples 
  Samuel D. Gosling, Carson J. Sandy, Oliver P. John and Jeff Potter
  Page 94
• WEIRD walking: Cross-cultural research on motor development 
  Lana B. Karasik, Karen E. Adolph, Catherine S. Tamis-LeMonda and Marc H. Bornstein
  Page 95
• The socio-ecological approach turns variance among populations from a liability to an asset 
  Selin Kesebir, Shigehiro Oishi and Barbara A. Spellman
  Page 96
• Determinants of cognitive variability 
  Sangeet S. Khemlani, N. Y. Louis Lee and Monica Bucciarelli
  Page 97
• Responsible behavioral science generalizations and applications require much more than non-WEIRD samples 
  Vladimir J. Koneni
  Page 98
• When nurture becomes nature: Ethnocentrism in studies of human development 
  David F. Lancy
  Page 99
• BIZARRE chimpanzees do not represent the chimpanzee 
  David A. Leavens, Kim A. Bard and William D. Hopkins
  Page 100
• Explaining why experimental behavior varies across cultures: A missing step in The weirdest people in the world? 
  Edouard Machery
  Page 101
• WEIRD societies may be more compatible with human nature 
  Alexandra Maryanski
  Page 103
• It's not just the subjects there are too many WEIRD researchers 
  Michael Meadon and David Spurrett
  Page 104
• Development: Evolutionary ecology's midwife 
  Karthik Panchanathan, Willem E. Frankenhuis and H. Clark Barrett
  Page 105
• ODD (observation- and description-deprived) psychological research 
  Tage S. Rai and Alan Fiske
  Page 106
• What is really wrong with a priori claims of universality? Sampling, validity, process level, and the irresistible drive to reduce 
  Philippe Rochat
  Page 107
• The weirdest people in the world are a harbinger of the future of the world 
  Paul Rozin
  Page 108
• Donald Campbell's doubt: Cultural difference or failure of communication? 
  Richard A. Shweder
  Page 109
• Philosophy and WEIRD intuition 
  Stephen Stich
  Page 110
• Beyond WEIRD: Towards a broad-based behavioral science 
  Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine and Ara Norenzayan
  Page 111
• Comorbidity: A network perspective 
  Ang\xE9lique O. J. Cramer, Lourens J. Waldorp, Han L. J. van der Maas and Denny Borsboom
  Page 137
• Latent variables and the network perspective 
  Catherine Belzung, Etienne Billette de Villemeur, Mael Lemoine and Vincent Camus
  Page 150
• The rocky road from Axis I to Axis II: Extending the network model of diagnostic comorbidity to personality pathology 
  Robert F. Bornstein
  Page 151
• Aligning psychological assessment with psychological science 
  Daniel Cervone
  Page 152
• Comorbid science?¹ 
  David Danks, Stephen Fancsali, Clark Glymour and Richard Scheines
  Page 153
• Visualizing genetic similarity at the symptom level: The example of learning disabilities 
  Oliver S. P. Davis and Robert Plomin
  Page 155
• An agenda for symptom-based research 
  William Fleeson, R. Michael Furr and Elizabeth Mayfield Arnold
  Page 157
• Extending the network perspective on comorbidity 
  Brian D. Haig and Frances M. Vertue
  Page 158
• Network models of psychopathology and comorbidity: Philosophical and pragmatic considerations 
  S. Brian Hood and Benjamin J. Lovett
  Page 159
• Is there a contradiction between the network and latent variable perspectives? 
  Stephen M. Humphry and Joshua A. McGrane
  Page 160
• Network origins of anxiety and depression 
  Michael E. Hyland
  Page 161
• The network perspective will help, but is comorbidity the question? 
  Wendy Johnson and Lars Penke
  Page 162
• Toward scientifically useful quantitative models of psychopathology: The importance of a comparative approach 
  Robert F. Krueger, Colin G. DeYoung and Kristian E. Markon
  Page 163
• Questions about networks, measurement, and causation 
  Keith A. Markus
  Page 164
• Symptoms as latent variables 
  Dennis J. McFarland and Loretta S. Malta
  Page 165
• Latent variable models are network models 
  Peter C. M. Molenaar
  Page 166
• Comorbidity: The case of developmental psychopathology 
  Aribert Rothenberger, Tobias Banaschewski, Andreas Becker and Veit Roessner
  Page 167
• Comorbidity: Cognition and biology count! 
  Orly Rubinsten and Avishai Henik
  Page 168
• Looking at comorbidity through the glasses of neuroscientific memory research: A brain-network perspective 
  Angelica Staniloiu and Hans J. Markowitsch
  Page 170
• The importance of modeling comorbidity using an intra-individual, time-series approach 
  Dana Tzur-Bitan, Nachshon Meiran and Golan Shahar
  Page 172
• Consequences of a network view for genetic association studies 
  Sophie van der Sluis, Kees-Jan Kan and Conor V. Dolan
  Page 173
• Networks as complex dynamic systems: Applications to clinical and developmental psychology and psychopathology 
  Paul L. C. van Geert and Henderien W. Steenbeek
  Page 174
• The missing developmental dimension in the network perspective 
  Sam Wass and Annette Karmiloff-Smith
  Page 175
• Comorbidity in the context of neural network properties 
  Juliana Yordanova, Vasil Kolev, Roumen Kirov and Aribert Rothenberger
  Page 176
• The abandonment of latent variables: Philosophical considerations 
  Peter Zachar
  Page 177
• Complex realities require complex theories: Refining and extending the network approach to mental disorders 
  Ang\xE9lique O. J. Cramer, Lourens J. Waldorp, Han L. J. van der Maas and Denny Borsboom
  Page 178
• Pr\xE9cis of Doing without Concepts 
  Edouard Machery
  Page 195
• Default knowledge, time pressure, and the theory-theory of concepts 
  Thomas Blanchard
  Page 206
• Carving nature at its joints using a knife called concepts 
  Justin J. Couchman, Joseph Boomer, Mariana V. C. Coutinho and J. David Smith
  Page 207
• Not different kinds, just special cases 
  David Danks
  Page 208
• An additional heterogeneity hypothesis 
  Guy Dove
  Page 209
• Unity amidst heterogeneity in theories of concepts 
  Kevan Edwards
  Page 210
• Two uneliminated uses for concepts: Hybrids and guides for inquiry 
  Chad Gonnerman and Jonathan M. Weinberg
  Page 211
• Concept talk cannot be avoided 
  James A. Hampton
  Page 212
• Eliminating the concept concept 
  Stevan Harnad
  Page 213
• Defending the concept of concepts 
  Brett K. Hayes and Lauren Kearney
  Page 214
• The faux, fake, forged, false, fabricated, and phony: Problems for the independence of similarity-based theories of concepts 
  Anne J. Jacobson
  Page 215
• The function and representation of concepts 
  Sangeet S. Khemlani and Geoffrey Goodwin
  Page 216
• Concepts are a functional kind 
  Elisabetta Lalumera
  Page 217
• From conceptual representations to explanatory relations 
  Tania Lombrozo
  Page 218
• Concepts and theoretical unification¹ 
  Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence
  Page 219
• Where are nature's joints? Finding the mechanisms underlying categorization 
  Arthur B. Markman
  Page 220
• Concepts versus conceptions (again)¹ 
  Georges Rey
  Page 221
• Why don't concepts constitute a natural kind? 
  Richard Samuels and Michael Ferreira
  Page 222
• Evidence of coordination as a cure for concept eliminativism 
  Andrea Scarantino
  Page 223
• Conceptual atomism rethought 
  Susan Schneider
  Page 224
• Banishing the thought 
  Nina Strohminger and Bradley W. Moore
  Page 225
• Are prototypes and exemplars used in distinct cognitive processes? 
  James Virtel and Gualtiero Piccinini
  Page 226
• Doing with development: Moving toward a complete theory of concepts 
  Haley A. Vlach, Lauren Krogh, Emily E. Thom and Catherine M. Sandhofer
  Page 227
• The theoretical indispensability of concepts 
  Daniel A. Weiskopf
  Page 228
• Developing without concepts 
  Yevdokiya Yermolayeva and David H. Rakison
  Page 229
• Parsimony and the triple-system model of concepts 
  Safa Zaki and Joe Cruz
  Page 230
• The heterogeneity of knowledge representation and the elimination of concept 
  Edouard Machery
  Page 231
• BBS volume 33 issue 2-3 Cover and Back matter 
  
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• BBS volume 33 issue 2-3 Cover and Front matter 
  
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