Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Volume 33 : Issue 4

Table of Contents

• Neural reuse: A fundamental organizational principle of the brain 
  Michael L. Anderson
  Page 245
• Reuse or re-function? 
  Daniela Aisenberg and Avishai Henik
  Page 266
• From the physical to the psychological: Mundane experiences influence social judgment and interpersonal behavior 
  John A. Bargh, Lawrence E. Williams, Julie Y. Huang, Hyunjin Song and Joshua M. Ackerman
  Page 267
• Neural reuse and cognitive homology 
  Vincent Bergeron
  Page 268
• Neural reuse implies distributed coding 
  Bruce Bridgeman
  Page 269
• Sensorimotor grounding and reused cognitive domains 
  Maria Brincker
  Page 270
• The importance of ontogenetic change in typical and atypical development 
  Tessa M. Dekker and Annette Karmiloff-Smith
  Page 271
• How and over what timescales does neural reuse actually occur? 
  Francesco Donnarumma, Roberto Prevete and Giuseppe Trautteur
  Page 272
• Sleep, neural reuse, and memory consolidation processes 
  William Fishbein, Hiuyan Lau, Rafael DeJes\xFAs and Sara Elizabeth Alger
  Page 273
• Understanding brain circuits and their dynamics 
  Antoni Gomila and Paco Calvo
  Page 274
• Neural reuse in the social and emotional brain 
  Mary Helen Immordino-Yang, Joan Y. Chiao and Alan P. Fiske
  Page 275
• Neural reuse: A polysemous and redundant biological system subserving niche-construction 
  Atsushi Iriki
  Page 276
• Multi-use and constraints from original use 
  Justin A. Jung\xE9 and Daniel C. Dennett
  Page 277
• Comparative studies provide evidence for neural reuse 
  Paul S. Katz
  Page 278
• No bootstrapping without semantic inheritance 
  Julian Kiverstein
  Page 279
• Redeployed functions versus spreading activation: A potential confound 
  Colin Klein
  Page 280
• Implications of neural reuse for brain injury therapy: Historical note on the work of Kurt Goldstein 
  Barry Lia
  Page 281
• Reuse in the brain and elsewhere 
  Bj\xF6rn Lindblom
  Page 282
• Let us redeploy attention to sensorimotor experience 
  Nicolas Michaux, Mauro Pesenti, Arnaud Badets, Samuel Di Luca and Michael Andres
  Page 283
• Neural reuse as a source of developmental homology 
  David S. Moore and Chris Moore
  Page 284
• Reuse of identified neurons in multiple neural circuits 
  Jeremy E. Niven and Lars Chittka
  Page 285
• The Leabra architecture: Specialization without modularity 
  Alexander A. Petrov, David J. Jilk and Randall C. O'Reilly
  Page 286
• Neural reuse and human individual differences 
  Cristina D. Rabaglia and Gary F. Marcus
  Page 287
• Reuse of molecules and of neural circuits 
  Mark Reimers
  Page 288
• Massive modularity is consistent with most forms of neural reuse 
  J. Brendan Ritchie and Peter Carruthers
  Page 289
• More than modularity and metaphor: The power of preadaptation and access 
  Paul Rozin
  Page 290
• Optical holography as an analogue for a neural reuse mechanism¹ 
  Ann Speed, Stephen J. Verzi, John S. Wagner and Christina Warrender
  Page 291
• Massive redeployment or distributed modularity? 
  Alexia Toskos Dils and Stephen J. Flusberg
  Page 292
• Belling the cat: Why reuse theory is not enough 
  Oscar Vilarroya
  Page 293
• Cortex in context: Response to commentaries on neural reuse 
  Michael L. Anderson
  Page 294
• Person as scientist, person as moralist 
  Joshua Knobe
  Page 315
• Competence: What's in? What's out? Who knows? 
  Joshua Alexander, Ronald Mallon and Jonathan M. Weinberg
  Page 329
• Culpable control or moral concepts? 
  Mark Alicke and David Rose
  Page 330
• Person as moralist and scientist 
  Marcus Vin\xEDcius C. Baldo and Anouk Barberousse
  Page 331
• Stupid people deserve what they get: The effects of personality assessment on judgments of intentional action 
  Berit Brogaard
  Page 332
• The social origin and moral nature of human thinking 
  Jeremy I. M. Carpendale, Stuart I. Hammond and Charlie Lewis
  Page 334
• Qualitative judgments, quantitative judgments, and norm-sensitivity 
  Paul Egr\xE9
  Page 335
• Modalities of word usage in intentionality and causality 
  Herbert Gintis
  Page 336
• Morals, beliefs, and counterfactuals 
  Vittorio Girotto, Luca Surian and Michael Siegal
  Page 337
• Questioning the influence of moral judgment 
  Steve Guglielmo
  Page 338
• Person as lawyer: How having a guilty mind explains attributions of intentional agency 
  Frank Hindriks
  Page 339
• The cultural capital of the moralist and the scientist 
  Min Ju Kang and Michael Glassman
  Page 340
• Are mental states assessed relative to what most people should or would think? Prescriptive and descriptive components of expected attitudes 
  Tamar A. Kreps and Beno\xEEt Monin
  Page 341
• Understanding the adult moralist requires first understanding the child scientist 
  Tamar Kushnir and Nadia Chernyak
  Page 343
• Putting normativity in its proper place 
  Tania Lombrozo and Kevin Uttich
  Page 344
• Norms, causes, and alternative possibilities 
  Peter Menzies
  Page 346
• Neither moralists, nor scientists: We are counterfactually reasoning animals 
  Bence Nanay
  Page 347
• Ambiguity of intention 
  Thomas M. Scanlon
  Page 348
• Alternatives and defaults: Knobe's two explanations of how moral judgments influence intuitions about intentionality and causation 
  Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
  Page 349
• Very like a whale: Analogies about the mind need salient similarity to convey information 
  David Spurrett and Jeffrey Martin
  Page 350
• Are we really moralizing creatures through and through? 
  Stephen Stich and Tomasz Wysocki
  Page 351
• Fixing the default position in Knobe's competence model 
  Joseph Ulatowski and Justus Johnson
  Page 352
• The person as moralist account and its alternatives 
  Joshua Knobe
  Page 353
• BBS volume 33 issue 4 Cover and Back matter 
  
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• BBS volume 33 issue 4 Cover and Front matter 
  
  Page f1