Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Volume 34 : Issue 5

Table of Contents

• Subtracting ¿ought¿ from ¿is¿: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking 
  Shira Elqayam and Jonathan St. B. T. Evans
  Page 233
• Norms for reasoning about decisions 
  Jean-François Bonnefon
  Page 249
• The unbearable lightness of ¿Thinking¿: Moving beyond simple concepts of thinking, rationality, and hypothesis testing 
  Gary L. Brase and James Shanteau
  Page 250
• Competence, reflective equilibrium, and dual-system theories 
  Wesley Buckwalter and Stephen Stich
  Page 251
• A role for normativism 
  Igor Douven
  Page 252
• The historical and philosophical origins of normativism 
  Catarina Dutilh Novaes
  Page 253
• Just the facts, and only the facts, about human rationality? 
  Jeffrey Foss
  Page 254
• Undisputed norms and normal errors in human thinking 
  Vittorio Girotto
  Page 255
• Normative theory in decision making and moral reasoning 
  Natalie Gold, Andrew M. Colman and Briony D. Pulford
  Page 256
• Why rational norms are indispensable 
  Ulrike Hahn
  Page 257
• Defending normativism 
  Steven Hrotic
  Page 258
• Cultural and individual differences in the generalization of theories regarding human thinking 
  Kyungil Kim and Youngjun Park
  Page 259
• Norms and high-level cognition: Consequences, trends, and antidotes 
  Simon McNair and Aidan Feeney
  Page 260
• Norms, goals, and the study of thinking 
  Raymond S. Nickerson
  Page 261
• The ¿is-ought fallacy¿ fallacy 
  Mike Oaksford and Nick Chater
  Page 262
• Systematic rationality norms provide research roadmaps and clarity 
  Niki Pfeifer
  Page 263
• A case for limited prescriptive normativism 
  Emmanuel M. Pothos and Jerome R. Busemeyer
  Page 264
• Epistemic normativity from the reasoner's viewpoint 
  Joëlle Proust
  Page 265
• Truth-conduciveness as the primary epistemic justification of normative systems of reasoning 
  Gerhard Schurz
  Page 266
• Reason is normative, and should be studied accordingly 
  David Spurrett
  Page 267
• Normative models in psychology are here to stay 
  Keith E. Stanovich
  Page 268
• Understanding reasoning: Let's describe what we really think about 
  Robert J. Sternberg
  Page 269
• Normative benchmarks are useful for studying individual differences in reasoning 
  Edward J. N. Stupple and Linden J. Ball
  Page 270
• Probability theory and perception of randomness: Bridging ¿ought¿ and ¿is¿ 
  Yanlong Sun and Hongbin Wang
  Page 271
• Normativism versus mechanism 
  Valerie A. Thompson
  Page 272
• Neurath's ship: The constitutive relation between normative and descriptive theories of rationality 
  Michael R. Waldmann
  Page 273
• What is evaluative normativity, that we (maybe) should avoid it? 
  Jonathan M. Weinberg
  Page 274
• Towards a descriptivist psychology of reasoning and decision making 
  Jonathan St. B. T. Evans and Shira Elqayam
  Page 275
• Is everyone Bayes? On the testable implications of Bayesian Fundamentalism ¿ Erratum 
  Maarten Speekenbrink and David R. Shanks
  Page 291
• BBS volume 34 issue 5 Cover and Front matter 
  
  Page f1
• BBS volume 34 issue 5 Cover and Back matter 
  
  Page b1