Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Volume 35 : Issue 1

Table of Contents

• Reciprocity: Weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate 
  Francesco Guala
  Page 1
• The social and psychological costs of punishing 
  Gabrielle S. Adams and Elizabeth Mullen
  Page 15
• Proximate and ultimate causes of punishment and strong reciprocity 
  Pat Barclay
  Page 16
• The restorative logic of punishment: Another argument in favor of weak selection 
  Nicolas Baumard
  Page 17
• Reciprocity and uncertainty 
  Yoella Bereby-Meyer
  Page 18
• Costs and benefits in hunter-gatherer punishment 
  Christopher Boehm
  Page 19
• The punishment that sustains cooperation is often coordinated and costly 
  Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd, Sarah Mathew and Peter J. Richerson
  Page 20
• Weak reciprocity alone cannot explain peer punishment 
  Marco Casari
  Page 21
• In medio stat virtus: Theoretical and methodological extremes regarding reciprocity will not explain complex social behaviors 
  Claudia Civai and Alan Langus
  Page 22
• Examining punishment at different explanatory levels 
  Miguel dos Santos and Claus Wedekind
  Page 23
• Retaliation and antisocial punishment are overlooked in many theoretical models as well as behavioral experiments 
  Anna Dreber and David G. Rand
  Page 24
• Blood, sex, personality, power, and altruism: Factors influencing the validity of strong reciprocity 
  Eamonn Ferguson and Philip Corr
  Page 25
• In the lab and the field: Punishment is rare in equilibrium 
  Simon Gächter
  Page 26
• The social structure of cooperation and punishment 
  Herbert Gintis and Ernst Fehr
  Page 28
• Understanding the research program 
  Joseph Henrich and Maciej Chudek
  Page 29
• Social preference experiments in animals: Strengthening the case for human preferences 
  Keith Jensen
  Page 30
• The strategic logic of costly punishment necessitates natural field experiments, and at least one such experiment exists 
  Tim Johnson
  Page 31
• Altruistic punishment: What field data can (and cannot) demonstrate 
  Nikos Nikiforakis
  Page 32
• Experiments combining communication with punishment options demonstrate how individuals can overcome social dilemmas 
  Elinor Ostrom
  Page 33
• Importing social preferences across contexts and the pitfall of over-generalization across theories 
  Anne C. Pisor and Daniel M. T. Fessler
  Page 34
• Culture: The missing piece in theories of weak and strong reciprocity 
  Dwight Read
  Page 35
• Towards a unified theory of reciprocity 
  Alejandro Rosas
  Page 36
• Special human vulnerability to low-cost collective punishment 
  Don Ross
  Page 37
• Strong reciprocity is not uncommon in the ¿wild¿ 
  W. G. Runciman
  Page 38
• Lab support for strong reciprocity is weak: Punishing for reputation rather than cooperation 
  Alex Shaw and Laurie Santos
  Page 39
• Punishing for your own good: The case of reputation-based cooperation 
  Claudio Tennie
  Page 40
• What we need is theory of human cooperation (and meta-analysis) to bridge the gap between the lab and the wild 
  Paul A. M. Van Lange, Daniel P. Balliet and Hans IJzerman
  Page 41
• The social costs of punishment 
  Pieter van den Berg, Lucas Molleman and Franz J. Weissing
  Page 42
• When the strong punish: Why net costs of punishment are often negligible 
  Christopher R. von Rueden and Michael Gurven
  Page 43
• Perspectives from ethnography on weak and strong reciprocity 
  Polly Wiessner
  Page 44
• Strong reciprocity is real, but there is no evidence that uncoordinated costly punishment sustains cooperation in the wild 
  Francesco Guala
  Page 45
• BBS volume 35 issue 1 Cover and Front matter 
  
  Page f1
• BBS volume 35 issue 1 Cover and Back matter 
  
  Page b1