From Towards a Science of Consciousness 3
Section 9:
Phenomenology CogNet
Proceedings
Being intensely engaged in relationship with another person is one of the greatest joys of being human. It is, perhaps, the most vital manifestation of consciousness. Yet it is an aspect of consciousness that, for the most part, has been conspicuously overlooked in philosophy of mind and the emerging field of consciousness studies. This approach to consciousness calls for a shift of perspective-from looking at the world as a collection of objects, or even as a collection of subjects, to a view which sees relationship as fundamental.
In this chapter, I argue that in addition to methodologies of first-person subjectivity (exploring consciousness from "within" through meditation and introspection), and third-person objectivity (studying external correlates of consciousness, such as brains and neurons), a holistic science of consciousness would also expand to include second-person intersubjective methodology and epistemology-to account for the inter-reflexivity of consciousness (subjectivity-reflected-in-subjectivity) in "I-thou" relationships.
To clarify what I mean by the second-person perspective, I will begin by discussing the key terms: "consciousness," "subjectivity," and "intersubjectivity." I will then state what I believe to be the central philosophical problem regarding these three concepts, and end by addressing some possible objections.
The most common misunderstanding arises from a basic confusion between the psychological and philosophical uses of the term. I find it helpful, therefore, to distinguish between two basic meanings of consciousness:
Psychological consciousness is about the contents of consciousness (e.g., thoughts, beliefs, images), and about the mode of access (conscious or unconscious) to these contents. It is also about the state of awareness, or form of consciousness, characterized by being awake or alert, and is contrasted with the "unconscious," a state of being asleep, and with psychic contents below the threshold of conscious-awake awareness. For example, a person engaged in conceptual cognition is conscious in this sense; a person in a coma, or a worm, are examples of what being unconscious means.Philosophical consciousness is about the context of consciousness; it is about the mode of being that makes possible any and all contents and forms of consciousness. Philosophically, consciousness is a state or quality of being, the fact of consciousness characterized by having a capacity for sentience, subjectivity, and self-agency. It is contrasted with being "nonconscious," a state of affairs wholly without sentience or subjectivity-that is, brute physicality. For example, a person (awake or asleep), a dog, or a worm exemplify consciousness in this sense; a rock, a cloud, or a computer do not. Looked at this way, it is clear that the philosophical meaning is more fundamental-for without consciousness as a state of being (i.e., an ontological reality) there could be no psychological states or contents. Even the psychological unconscious has something psychic or mental going on. To be unconscious is still to be sentient (worms and sleeping people still feel), whereas to be nonconscious is not (rocks and computers do not feel).
Subjectivity-1: "Experienced interiority." In the first case, subjectivity means, essentially, a capacity for feeling that is intrinsic, or interior, to the entity under consideration-a what-it-feels-like-from-within. The key notion here is "experienced interiority" as distinct from vacuous (i.e., without experience) external relations. A subject is constituted by internal relations, and these are felt or experienced. Without experience there could be no subjectivity (and vice versa; in fact, the two words are virtually synonymous); and experience is always internal or intrinsic to the subject-that is to say, experience doesn't "happen to" a subject, it is constitutive of the subject.Subjectivity has a point of view. It "takes account of," or feels, its own being. Its being is validated, felt, or known from within itself-hence it is first-person-not just from without. It cannot be fully accounted for by external, mechanical relations. A subject lives or endures through time, feeling its own continuity.
Subjectivity-2: "Private, independent, isolated experience." In another, related through restricted, sense, subjectivity means an isolated, independent, self-sufficient locus of experience. Classically, this is the Cartesian ego, wholly private, and independent of all reality external to it. In the first case, subjectivity-1, experienced interiority is not automatically self-contained within its own private domain-it is interior, but not necessarily independent or isolated. The question of whether it is self-contained or interdependent is left open: It is possible for subjectivity-1 to be either interior and shared, or interior and private. In this second, Cartesian, case, the subject is not only interior, it is self-contained and private. Such independent egos, or subjects-Leibniz called them "monads"-can communicate only via mediating signals, whereas subjectivity-1 can communicate by participating in shared presence. With subjectivity-1, interiority or feeling can be "intersubjective" and precede individual subjects; in subjectivity-2, interiority is always private, and intersubjectivity, if it occurs, is always secondary.
The basic difference to note here is between intersubjective agreement (1), where my language about the world conforms to yours, through exchange of conceptual and linguistic tokens, and intersubjective participation (2), or intersubjective co-creativity (3), where my experience of myself shows up qualitatively differently when I engage with you as a reciprocating center of experience. The first kind, the standard meaning of intersubjectivity, is used to describe what otherwise goes by the name of "objectivity" in science (Velmans 1993), and is not what I am concerned with in this chapter. I am trying to get at something deeper, something with potentially profound implications for philosophy of mind and consciousness studies in general.
Intersubjectivity-1: This standard meaning derives from Cartesian subjectivity (isolated, independent subjects). Here, individual subjectivity ontologically precedes intersubjectivity. Individual, isolated subjects come first, and then through communication of signals arrive at consensual agreement. Here, the "inter" in intersubjectivity refers to agreement "between" subjects about so-called objective facts-and the subjects don't even have to interact (their agreement could be validated by a third party, as indeed is often the case in science).Intersubjectivity-2: Here, the sense of individual subjects remains, but now intersubjectivity refers to how the experience or consciousness of participating subjects is influenced and conditioned by their mutual interaction and engagement. The emphasis here is on the shared "experienced interiority" of the subjects as they interact, not on their "objective" agreement about some item of knowledge. Although this is a significant shift of emphasis from the standard meaning of intersubjectivity, nevertheless it is "weak" compared with the "strong" shift we will look at below. It is "weak," not because the participation/engagement involved is weak-indeed it could be intense-but because it refers to changes that happen to the form of consciousness of the participating subjects, not to the fact of such consciousness. It is "weak" because it still posits subjectivity as ontologically prior to intersubjectivity. Here, the "inter" in intersubjectivity refers to the mutual "structural coupling" of already existing experiencing subjects, where the interiorities of the participating subjects are interdependently shaped by their interaction.
Intersubjectivity-3: This is the most radical meaning, and the one that poses the greatest challenge to philosophy of mind. According to this "stronger" meaning, intersubjectivity is truly a process of co-creativity, where relationship is ontologically primary. All individuated subjects co-emerge, or co-arise, as a result of a holistic "field" of relationships. The being of any one subject is thoroughly dependent on the being of all other subjects, with which it is in relationship. Here, intersubjectivity precedes subjectivity (in the second, Cartesian, sense, but subjectivity in the first sense, of experienced interiority, is implicit throughout). The fact, not just the form, of subjectivity-2 (individual Cartesian subjects) is a consequence of intersubjectivity. Here, the "inter" in intersubjectivity refers to an "interpenetrating" co-creation of loci of subjectivity-a thoroughly holistic and organismic mutuality.
(1) Is the basic distinction between the standard meaning of intersubjectivity as "consensual agreement" and the other two experiential forms identified here legitimate? If we accept the first meaning of subjectivity ("experienced interiority")-and what else could subjectivity mean if we excluded this?-I believe that we need a way to account for phenomenological data, such as experiences of rapport, empathy, and love between interacting subjects, which prima facie cannot be wholly explained in terms of exchange of linguistic or other signals. Phenomenologically and logically, therefore, the distinction is valid: Intersubjectivity cannot be restricted to the standard meaning of "consensual validation" of observations via exchange of physical signals.
(2) If the above distinction is valid, do interacting subjects actively shape the form and content of each other's experience? Volumes of data from social psychology, communications theory, psychoanalysis, anthropology, not to mention much commonsense folk psychology-plus the answer to (1) above-hardly leave us any doubt: Interacting people do influence and condition each other's experience and contents of consciousness (how else could communication occur?). If this were the full extent of the expanded meaning of intersubjectivity, the point would be trivial. It is questions (3), (4), and (5) that raise controversial epistemological and ontological issues for philosophy of mind and consciousness studies.
(3) Can one subject have direct access (not mediated by signals) to knowledge of how the other experiences this change? If we can answer yes to this, then the epistemological tradition we have inherited from Kant and the Enlightenment would be radically undermined. The hoary problem of other minds would finally have a solution.
(4) Through knowledge of how "I" show up in "your" experience, can I come to know something about my own consciousness?If the answer to both this and (3) is "yes," the implications for a second-person methodology in consciousness studies would be far-reaching. For one thing, it would indicate, at least, that dialogic interaction could serve as a "mirror" for exploring consciousness; and, more radically, that the consciousness of engaged participants is mutually constitutive, not merely reflective. Which leads to
(5) Does intersubjectivity actually create individual subjectivities, is it ontologically primary, or does intersubjectivity presuppose already existing centers of subjectivity? If intersubjectivity is primary, then pretty much the entire edifice of conventional philosophy and science, based on an ontology of substance (both of matter and mind) would be seriously challenged. For how could there be intersubjectivity without there being always already existing subjects? How could there be relations without pre-existing relata? Commonsense and logic may seem to demand that for there to be relationship there haveto be things to relate in the first place. Given an ontology of substance (whether of physical energy or of Cartesian minds), the primacy of relata seems compelling. However, we have examples of alternative ontologies from, for instance, Alfred North Whitehead (1979) and Buddhism (Macy 1991), where process is ontologically fundamental. These ontologies present coherent accounts where relationships are primary, where relata are constituted by their relationships. In such cosmologies, intersubjectivity precedes subjectivity (Cartesian sense). Of course, even in these alternative ontologies, intersubjectivity presupposes subjectivity in the sense of "experienced interiority."
Whereas the fact of experienced interiority is a precondition for intersubjectivity, the formsof individual subjectivities (how that interiority is shaped and experienced in individual subjects) need not-and in the cases of Whitehead and Buddhism do not-require pre-existent Cartesian subjects. Such transient "forms," co-created as perishable centers of experience in the interplay and flux of intersubjective fact, are the individual subjects.
Whether we go all out, and try to make a case for this strong version of intersubjectivity-with its profound philosophical implications-or keep our sights on a closer horizon by focusing on the "weaker" sense of intersubjectivity-with its implications for psychology and studies of the contents of consciousness-we still need to make a break from the conventional dichotomy of studying the mind from either a third-person or first-person perspective. We need to introduce a second-person perspective to complement our studies of consciousness in philosophy of mind, cognitive science, psychology, and the neurosciences.
One reviewer of an earlier version of this chapter thought it "plausible" that intersubjectivity could be explained as "a combination of subjectivity and objectivity," and that any description of intersubjectivity must rule out such a reduction. Another objected to the notion that a second-person "you" is a logically and ontologically distinct category between the self and the object. He/she dismisses the second-person as "logically incorrect" and "unnecessary."
As I see it, we have three options: We could take an extreme elminativist position and claim that the notion of a second-person "you" is semantically empty, without any referent. Alternatively, we could say that the second-person referent is ultimately reducible to either of the two other perspectives. I reject the first option for the same kinds of reasons I reject eliminative positions on first-person consciousness. It involves a performative contradiction: In this case, who might the eliminativist be talking to? If there is no "you," no "others," why publish anything at all on this position?
If, then, we reject the hard eliminativist position, is a "softer" reductionist position more viable? On the one hand, we have the first-person subject, and on the other, the third-person object as options for intertheoretic reduction. Now, if the second-person "you" is both "logically incorrect and unnecessary," then it must either fall into the category of first-person subject or third-person object. Which is it? Is another person wholly accounted for from the first-person perspective? This would be tantamount to solipsism, and would deny any experiential reality to the "other"-again leading to performative contradictions. Failing this, is another person (a "you") wholly accounted for as a third-person object or collection of objects? Is there no difference between an entity which might be wholly objective (i.e., without any experiential interiority)-say a rock-and another human being? On experiential and logical grounds, I refuse to accept that "you" (meaning any other person) are nothing but a collection of objective physical things, lacking any sentience and experience with which I could engage in dialogue.
The "you" that the reductionist would like to ignore is any other locus of experience, which both logically and ontologically cannot be accounted for exclusively in terms of either first-person "I"s or third-person "its."
It is certainly possible that there may be first-person introspection going on simultaneously with second-person engagement-in fact, such introspection is an integral element in the methodology of Bohmian dialogue-where it is called "proprioception" (Bohm 1996). But the point is that both the quality and the content of such introspection is radically different when done in conjunction with another person (or a group of people) similarly engaged, from when done solo. We show up differently to ourselves when we engage intersubjectively. This kind of knowing is pertinent to exploring the "forms and contents" of consciousness (i.e., to a comprehensive psychology of consciousness). I am not sure that a second-perspective alone (using, for example, the methodology of Bohmian dialogue) would be sufficient to enlighten us regarding the ontological nature of consciousness. Likewise, I doubt that either the first-person or third-person perspective on its own is sufficient. Part of the point of this chapter is to call for a comprehensive, integral approach which includes first-person introspection, second-person engagement, and third-person rational and empirical analysis.
I can see no way of decisively eliminating all possibility of epistemological error-particularly regarding issues of consciousness. This is as true for first-person investigation of subjectivity, where we must confront the notorious biases and hidden motivations of the unconscious, as it is for intersubjectivity. It is also true, of course, for third-person investigation where the senses can be, likewise, notoriously deceptive. In the case of first-person subjectivity, many spiritual disciplines advocate working with an already-enlightened master to minimize illusion and self-delusion. In the case of third-person investigation, the unreliability of the senses is counteracted by the procedure of peer-review and repeated experiments, leading to what is usually called objectivity but which is really intersubjectivity in the sense of consensual agreement ("Intersubjectivity-1").
In both cases, the precautions against epistemological distortion involve, interestingly enough, some form of intersubjectivity. In the case of the student-master relationship in spiritual disciplines, that relationship is a quintessential example of second-person engagement. In the case of scientific experiments, scientists take recourse to "standard intersubjectivity" (as defined above). Similarly, I would propose, that the best way to guard against second-person distortion would be to engage with multiple dialogue partners-on the premise that if the reflection of the self in all others is liable to distortion, it is unlikely to be distorted in the same way in every case. A canceling-out effect, and/or repetition of common elements in the reflection from multiple partners, would be the best guarantee of epistemological accuracy.
A longer version of this chapter is available from the author at The Institute of Noetic Sciences, 475 Gate Five Road, # 300, Sausalito, CA 94965. Email: cdeq@noetic. org
2. One reviewer challenged my question "how can you introspect the presence of another" by pointing out that Husserl, in the fifth of his Cartesian Meditations, explicitly lays out a phenomenological method for doing precisely this. But Husserl's phenomenological "introspection" of otherness, in fact, explicitly invokes the requirement of intersubjectivity. For Husserl, my first-person apprehension of "otherness" is not constituted by wholly private subjectivity (in the second, Cartesian, sense of independent, isolated ego), but is "other than mine alone" arising in "an intersubjective world." In Husserl's own words he expresses, in almost Buberian terms, the mutuality of intersubjective presence:
I experience others as actually existing and . . . not as mere physical things. . . . I experience them at the same time as subjects for this world, as experiencing it (this same world that I experience) and, in so doing, experiencing me too, even as I experience the world and others in it. . . . In any case then, within myself, within the limits of my transcendentally reduced pure conscious life, I experience the world (including others)-and according to its experiential sense, not as (so to speak) my private synthetic formation but as other than mine alone [mir fremde], as an intersubjectiveworld, actually there for everyone, accessible in respect of its Objects to everyone (Husserl 1995, p. 91; emphases in original).Like Husserl, we can-and indeed we must-access our own personal subjectivity (as experienced interiority) if we are to engage the presence of another subject in the world. In this sense, and only in this sense, do we "introspect" others. The point is, of course, that, such "introspection" is conditioned by the Other simultaneously introspecting us. It is a mutual engaged presence, not a lone act of exploration of our own, first-person, private experience. We do not find the Other by introspecting our own "privatesynthetic formation," our own private subjective ego. If the methodology of introspection is to reveal the mutuality of intersubjective consciousness, it necessarily implies a second-person methodology of engaged presence-of an "I-thou" relationship. This is not at all the same as mere first-person introspection or contemplation. If there is any intertheoretic reduction to be done between first- and second-person perspectives, it would move in the opposite direction: explaining first-person experience as a derivative of second-person, intersubjective, mutual formations. In a word: Each instance of experienced interiority would be an intersubjective formation-and not strictly "mine" or "yours" in any exclusive first-person sense.
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